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The Bane of Surrogate Decision Making:
Defining the Best Interests of
Never-Competent Persons
Norman L. Cantor
Abstract
The medical fate of never-competent persons cannot be resolved according to
the approach governing previously competent persons – surrogate focus on self-
determination via advance instructions or projections of what the now-incompetent
person would want in the circumstances. For never-competent medical patients,
the commonly stated approach to surrogate decision making is best interests of
the incapacitated ward.
This article examines and questions the conventional wisdom regarding a “best
interests of the patient” standard. When a parent is the surrogate decision maker,
the medical course chosen need not be the best course, so long as it is a plausible
medical option and is not so antithetical to the patient’s interests as to consti-
tute neglect or abuse. And while third party interests are not officially part of a
never-competent patient’s interests, third-party interests constitute a looming om-
nipresence that inevitably influences surrogate decision making at the margins.
That is so especially where the never-competent patient’s own interests are murky
or in equipoise, and the potential impact on third parties is extreme.
Never-competent persons, as possessors of full moral status, are also entitled to
be treated with dignity. This normally means that a surrogate decision-maker will
maximally preserve the life of a ward. Sometimes, though, respect for the intrin-
sic human dignity of a fatally stricken ward dictates that the ward be allowed to
die. A permanently unconscious person offers an example, as does an infant with
multiple deficits whose short life will be pervaded by intrusive medical interven-
tions. In these rare instances, the deterioration or debilitation of a human being
is so extreme that further medical intervention would be inhumane. This is so for
some never-competent persons, just as it is for some formerly competent persons.
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The Bane of Surrogate Decisonmaking:
Defining the Best Interests of Never-Competent Persons
Anglo-American law has traditionally recognized a sovereign’s authority to protect
helpless populations.  This state authority, known as the parens patriae power, is described as
“the inherent equitable authority of the sovereign to protect those persons within the state who
cannot protect themselves because of an innate legal disability.”1  Some persons’ mental function
is so limited that they cannot be accorded self-determination regarding important matters
affecting their lives.  These profoundly disabled2 persons3 are so mentally impaired that they
cannot make serious medical decisions for themselves.  Someone (a surrogate) must decide on
behalf of such incapacitated persons whether to initiate and maintain medical interventions.  That
surrogate is usually a family member, but it can sometimes be a judicially appointed guardian or
even a court (as to particularly delicate medical issues like sterilization or organ donation).  In all
instances, the profoundly disabled person is vulnerable -- unable to assert independent judgment
or to effectively protest against any ill-considered surrogate decisions.  
Government’s parens patriae authority is the vehicle for safeguarding a profoundly
disabled person against abusive surrogate decisions.  The watchword for parens patriae
jurisdiction is the best interests of the disabled person.  Because the rationale for governmental
oversight is protection of the ward, it is natural that the concept of best interests of the ward
should dominate surrogate decisionmaking for never-competent persons.4  That is, whenever
government intervenes to scrutinize a surrogate’s medical determination on behalf of a helpless
person, or whenever a problematic medical issue is reserved for judicial resolution, that helpless
person’s interests are ostensibly the key factor.  Not surprisingly, then, best interests of the
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profoundly disabled patient has emerged as the common guideline for surrogate decisionmaking
in disparate medico-legal areas including end-of-life decisions, abortion, sterilization, and organ
donation.
Identification of best interests of the patient as the prevailing standard for surrogate
decisionmaking leaves many questions unresolved.  As examples, what are the components of
the best interests formula -- i.e., what kinds of benefits and burdens can be considered by a
conscientious surrogate?  How are the interests and well being of a profoundly disabled and
barely communicative person assessed and measured?  To what extent does quality of life play a
role in decisionmaking for the profoundly disabled?  Whose perspective on quality of life
governs -- that of the guardian, the ward, or some hypothetical reasonable person?   What is the
role of human dignity within a best interests of the patient formula?  Is it permissible for a
surrogate decisionmaker to consider the interests of other persons, such as surrounding family
and caregivers?  How about the interests of society in avoiding extraordinary expense or in
allocating scarce medical resources in a sound fashion?  Must a surrogate decisionmaker seek to
advance the best interests of the ward, or is it sufficient to act in a manner generally consistent
with the ward’s interests?   What standard of proof of best interests should the surrogate employ -
- preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or some other standard of
inquiry?  These questions will be addressed in this article, primarily in the setting of end-of-life
decisionmaking and sterilization, as the jurisprudence under those two headings is relatively well 
developed.
The Focus on a Never-competent Patient’s Well Being
Most jurisprudence relating to end-of-life medical decisions by surrogates focuses on
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fulfillment of the self-determination interest of formerly competent patients.  (I am referring here
to the medical handling of the full range of mentally incapacitated patients, not just never-
competent, profoundly disabled persons).  The earliest decisions regarding end-of-life care --
Quinlan and some succeeding cases -- articulated a substituted judgment standard in order to
preserve the now-incompetent patient’s liberty interest in choosing whether to accept or refuse
life-sustaining medical intervention.5  That early effort to honor self-determination of formerly
competent persons has been reinforced by subsequent developments.  Every jurisdiction that has
spoken to end-of-life surrogate decisionmaking has upheld a formerly competent patient’s
prerogative to shape post-competence care either by advance medical directive or other prior
expressions.  In most jurisdictions, the formerly competent patient’s values and preferences --
even if not explicitly directed toward end-of-life choices -- are also deemed relevant to surrogate
decisionmaking.  This is so under a substituted judgment formula, where a patient’s religious
values or philosophical preferences can be determinative of post-competence care.6   And it is
often the case under a best interests of the patient formula, at least in the many jurisdictions
where the formerly competent patient’s wishes, values, and preferences are considered part of the
now-incompetent patient’s interests to be implemented by a surrogate.  All this reliance on prior
expressions and previously formed values seeks to honor the previously competent patient’s
autonomy or self-determination.
Even if the patient’s previous values and expressed preferences don’t furnish clearcut
guidelines, the surrogate decisionmaker can still draw guidance from a projection of what most
people would want done for themselves in the circumstances of the particular case.  Again, this is
so under both a substituted judgment standard and a best interests formula.  Under the former, a
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surrogate may assume that a now-incompetent person (who has not provided contrary
indications) would want what a strong majority of people would want done in the circumstances.7
Under a best interests approach, the factors to be considered by a surrogate -- physical and
mental suffering, chances of recovery, nature of patient interaction with his or her environment,
regaining of function, indignity, etc. -- are drawn from what most people consider to be critical
factors in shaping post-competence decisionmaking.  The overall object of the surrogate becomes
to replicate the now-incompetent patient’s likely choices as determined by what most people
would want done for themselves.8  Now-incompetent patients are assumed to want their interests
furthered and to have those interests defined according to majority preferences -- absent personal
indications to the contrary.  I call this constructive preference, as opposed to actual preference,
because the approach governs formerly competent persons who have not left clearcut indications
of their own end-of-life medical choices.  But the approach still seeks to honor self-determination
by implementing the now-incompetent patient’s likely, albeit putative, wishes.9
This article focuses on the profoundly disabled.  Profoundly disabled persons, by
definition, have never had the capacity for autonomy -- have never had the ability to issue
instructions concerning end-of-life treatment (or other serious medical matters) or to form values
and preferences that would guide surrogate decisionmakers.  And it is a lot more logical to
attribute majoritarian values to formerly competent persons, who have once had the perspective
of a competent person, than to attribute them to profoundly disabled persons whose values are
either non-existent or opaque.   Neither actual preference nor constructive preference would
therefore seem to provide a determinative guide for this never-competent population.10
Not surprisingly, then, the bulk of commentators and courts have rejected application of a
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substituted judgment standard – a standard seeking to replicate the patient’s own likely decision
– in the context of a never-competent person.  According to one early commentator, it is “non-
sensical” to ask what a person with the mental age of a small child would choose.11  And an
Illinois court was similarly disparaging of the substituted judgment standard in the context of
three and one-half year old twins, one of whose parents was hoping to use the twins as bone
marrow donors to rescue the twins’ dying half brother.  In finding substituted judgment irrelevant
to the children’s situation, the court remarked: “[I]t is not possible to discover the child’s likely
treatment/ non-treatment preferences by examining the child’s philosophy, religion and moral
views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should be lived * * *.”12
Another court recently noted the “limited relevance” of substituted judgment because children
[and never-competent persons] have “no articulable judgment to be substituted.”13
A few sources nonetheless insist on talking about substituted judgment even in the
context of never-competent persons.  Massachusetts, for example, has clung to substituted
judgment for the profoundly disabled ever since that standard was applied in 1976 to Joseph
Saikewicz a 62 year old, severely retarded man whose cancer treatment was in issue.  And a few
cases and a few commentators about decisionmaking for profoundly disabled newborns
recommend that  surrogates put themselves in the place of the newborns and impute a judgment
to the infant as though it were a moral agent.  According to this commentary, the surrogate
should ask: “Would the infant wish to lead such a life if it had the capacity of choosing for
himself or herself.”14   This transposition of a judgment to a profoundly disabled infant is
grounded in a commendable motive -- reminding the surrogate and all involved individuals about
the human stature and personhood of the infant.  But most commentators understandably deride
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the notion of attributing judgments or preferences to profoundly disabled persons as being
muddled and non-sensical.15  The strong majority of courts have refused to apply a substituted
judgment standard in the context of never-competent patients.  
Even in the few judicial decisions nominally applying a substituted judgment standard to
a never-competent patient, the standards of substituted judgment and best interests often meld
and the court ends up relying on the patient’s best interests.  Because there is no basis for
ascribing a personal choice – in the sense of personal preference among competing values and
interests – to a profoundly disabled person, the courts purporting to apply a substituted judgment
standard end up resolving the disabled patient’s medical fate according to a projected weighing
of the patient’s future pleasure and pain.  In other words, they end up applying a best interests of
the patient standard.  That was true in Strunk v. Strunk, the 1969 case  involving a kidney
donation from a profoundly disabled sibling and in the 1976 Saikewicz case16 involving a
profoundly disabled, terminal cancer patient.  In each instance, the court selected a medical
course for the never-competent person that the court believed would best promote the disabled
person’s interests in avoiding suffering (from loss of a beloved sibling or from the rigors of a
chemotherapy regimen) and in deriving satisfaction or pleasure from existence.  
The commonly articulated standard for the never-competent person is the same standard
that has guided parens patriae jurisdiction for centuries -- the best interests of the patient.  The
strong majority of courts addressing surrogate medical decisions on behalf of profoundly
disabled persons -- whether in the context of cessation of life support, sterilization, or organ
donation -- have prescribed a best interests test.  Most protocols governing clinical practice also
prescribe that best interests should determine the medical fate of now-incompetent persons who
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have never provided definitive guidance on their own.17  As applied to the end-of-life setting, this
means that life support should be maintained unless the patient would be better off dead than
alive, i.e., unless the burdens of further existence would outweigh the benefits.18   As applied to
other medical issues such as sterilization, the issue becomes whether the benefits of the
contemplated medical intervention would outweigh the detriments, i.e., whether the net welfare
of the profoundly disabled patient would be advanced by performance of the contemplated
procedure.  
The Problematic of Assessing Well Being
 Application of a best interests standard to profoundly disabled, dying patients presents
special challenges.  The determination of whether the patient is better off dead than alive
provides an illustration.  One underlying assumption in the context of end-of-life medical
decisions is that a person’s suffering can be so severe and unremitting as to outweigh the benefits
-- the pleasures and satisfaction -- of further existence.  In such instances, best interests dictate
cessation of life-sustaining medical intervention.  That approach to end-of-life decisions seems
valid as applied to never-competent as well as previously competent beings.  The devastating
impact of intense pain on the patient and on inter-personal relations would seem as great for
profoundly disabled persons as for others.  While avoidance of unremitting suffering is not a self-
determined value for a profoundly disabled person, our understanding of human nature and the
horror of extreme, unremitting suffering19 warrant injecting that value into standards governing
medical decisions for the never-competent patient.
How much suffering, though, is so intolerable as to make non-existence the right choice? 
And how can a surrogate make that assessment for a profoundly disabled person?  There are
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special difficulties that handicap that task.
For starters, what perspective does a surrogate assume when assessing the best interests
of a never-competent person in the context of serious medical issues.  The common wisdom
concerning best interests says that the judgment of “a reasonable person” must be determinative
as to the net well being of an incapacitated person.20  This makes sense, as a profoundly disabled
being cannot be expected to make or have a considered judgment about best interests when
completely unable to grasp the component elements like non-existence or net welfare.  Only a
mentally competent person can make a considered judgment about whether the burdens of
continued existence outweigh the benefits or whether the burdens and detriments of sterilization
outweigh the benefits.  The question is “what a reasonable person with the characteristics of the
incompetent would [do] under similar circumstances.”21  And it is not far-fetched to suppose that
a never-competent patient, if miraculously competent, would want medical decisions to be based
on the patient’s interests as assessed by a reasonable person.
At the same time that a conscientious surrogate must use the reasonable person
perspective in fixing what level of suffering should be deemed intolerable, that surrogate must
scrupulously adhere to the disabled person’s perspective in discerning the levels of suffering and
gratification actually present (or foreseeable) in any individual case.  The object is to discern the
benefits and burdens from the point of view of the profoundly disabled patient rather than that of
a competent person (such as the surrogate) who has experienced the benefits and developed the
expectations of a fully abled existence.  The question is whether the particular patient would be
better off dead than alive in the circumstances facing the patient,22 not whether the surrogate (or
even the average capacitated person) would want to live in those circumstances.
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It is inherently difficult for a fully capacitated surrogate to assume the point of view of a
person who has always been profoundly debilitated.  The competent surrogate’s frame of
reference is vastly different from the never-competent patient.  It may be hard “for the fully
competent person to have the sympathetic insight . . . into what it is like” to experience the world
with gravely diminished mental function.23  A strong temptation exists to transpose or project the
fully capacitated surrogate’s feelings onto the incapacitated patient.24  For example, it is common
to ascribe hunger to a gravely debilitated, dying patient who is refusing nutrition when the reality
is that the patient is not hungry.25  And while there is no reason to think that a profoundly
disabled person suffers from the mere status of being extremely cognitively disabled, the
capacitated observer may attribute feelings of frustration or anxiety that the capacitated person
thinks he or she would feel in comparable circumstances.  One commentator laments a “grave
danger of injecting our own values onto the child who has absolutely no basis for the fears and
horrors we might have for ourselves in a similar state.”26  The hazard also exists that the
competent surrogate will undervalue the simple benefits that the disabled patient derives from
existence and project negative feelings (e.g., frustration flowing from incapacity or
embarrassment from posing a burden upon others) to the disabled patient based on a competent
person’s assumptions or prejudices about a profoundly disabled existence.27
A similar hazard is that the competent surrogate will inject personal values into the best
interests determination.  (This happens, for example, when parents who are Christian Scientists
or Jehovah’s Witnesses use their own religious beliefs in forgoing important medical
intervention for small children or other profoundly disabled charges).  Or a competent
surrogate’s personal perspective on quality of life can distort an assessment of a profoundly
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disabled patient’s well being and best interests.  A distorted, stereotyped view of the impact of
Down’s Syndrome led one set of parents in 1982 to inappropriately withhold life-preserving
surgery for their newborn infant.28  All this is not to say that the requisite surrogate judgments are
impossible, only that there are reasons for scrutiny of such judgments.
While the burdens of a profoundly disabled person’s existence may in some instances
outweigh the benefits so that cessation of life-sustaining medical intervention becomes consistent
with that patient’s best interests, a surrogate decisionmaker’s determination of that status faces
another major hurdle in assessing the experiential reality of a profoundly disabled person -- a
person whose cognitive understanding and communicative ability are likely to be extremely
limited.  To determine the best interests of a profoundly disabled person, a surrogate must be
sensitive to “noncognitive notions of well being” grounded in “emotional and relational well
being.”29  Yet assessing the subjective reality behind the disabled person’s sounds and gestures is
an extremely daunting task.30  At the extremes, this assessment or measurement barrier may be
surmountable by an attentive surrogate.  Susan Martyn exhorts “caring interpreters” to determine
what the profoundly disabled patient “finds meaningful in life” and “how that person experiences
life.”31  The behavior and expressions of some persons may reflect such extreme and unmitigated
suffering as to readily prompt a conclusion that non-existence is preferable to life.  Or, by
contrast, a profoundly disabled person’s continued participation in, and response to, ostensibly
enjoyable activity may make a life-affirming conclusion easy.32  Putting those extremes aside,
discernment of the profoundly disabled patient’s experiential reality may be dependent on
interpretation of signals and expressions -- including enigmatic verbal expressions as well as
non-verbal communication such as grimaces, moans, screams, smiles, and gestures -- that are
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difficult to decipher.  The difficulty of discerning the true feelings of the disabled person is, of
course, compounded by the previously mentioned temptation of a fully capacitated surrogate to
project certain feelings onto an incapacitated ward.
The problematic of assessing the best interests of profoundly disabled beings is illustrated
in the context of infants or young children born with grave afflictions certain to shorten their
lives.33  In some instances, their abbreviated lives will be accompanied by extreme dysfunction,
considerable pain and suffering, and fairly continuous and intrusive medical interventions.  State
law generally accepts the principle that the best interests of at least some afflicted children would
be served by withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical intervention.34  Yet parents and
health care providers seeking to apply this principle must cope with various uncertainties --
uncertainty in measuring degree of pain, uncertainty in projecting precise level of mental
dysfunction, uncertainty regarding duration of potential survival, and uncertainty in determining
whether the suffering outweighs potential satisfactions from interactions with people and
environment.35  Take Baby Rena as an example.36  She was an 18 month-old infant dying of
AIDS.  She had become ventilator dependent and was constantly sedated to relieve pain.  She
retained some awareness of her environment.  Every time she was handled in any fashion her
blood pressure shot up and tears streamed from her eyes.   Was it in her best interests to have the
ventilator withdrawn so that she would die?  Was her suffering so extreme and unremitting that
she would be better off dead than alive?37   Baby Rena was already 18 months old and her
condition and prognosis were well established.  The difficulty of surrogate decisionmaking is
compounded in the case of newborns whose prognoses are ultimately dismal, but whose precise
levels of pain and cognitive dysfunction cannot yet be fixed.
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Opposition has always existed to any parental prerogative to withhold or withdraw life
support from an infant, even where that decision purports to be in the infant’s best interests.  Part
of that opposition stems from fear of parental (or professional) prejudice or ignorance about life
as a disabled person, as occurred in the 1982 Indiana case allowing the withholding of critical
medical treatment from a Down’s syndrome infant.  There, the parents determined to withhold
lifesaving treatment on the basis that Down’s syndrome children “don’t do very well” and cannot
be happy.38  In the wake of that 1982 incident, the federal government sought to curb all
decisions allowing newborns to die.  An initial federal attempt to attack such decisions as
unlawful discrimination against disabled persons failed.  The courts ruled that the federal
regulations exceeded the scope of authority that Congress had conferred.39  Congress responded
in 1984 by adopting the Child Abuse Amendments to a statute dealing with federal grants to
states for the operation of child protection programs.  Those amendments conditioned the grant
of federal funds upon state establishment of procedures to ensure that “medically indicated
treatment” would always be provided to infants.  Narrow statutory exclusions from required
treatment applied only for comatose infants, infants unavoidably dying so that treatment would
be futile, and situations where treatment would be “virtually futile” and “inhumane.”40  Federal
interpretive guidelines indicated that the last-mentioned exclusion covered only treatment
“highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future” and did not cover non-treatment “based on
subjective opinions about future quality of life of a disabled person.”41
The impact of these federal efforts upon neonatal care practices is unknown, but it may
well be “quite small.”42  The federal regulations themselves don’t apply directly to health care
providers; the only sanction for “non-compliance” would be withdrawal of federal funding for
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certain state child abuse prevention programs (as opposed to any direct penalty upon a health
care provider).43  The federal impact is also likely small because of the compelling need to make
some decisions not to treat newborns with certain severe deficits.  Some congenital anomalies
entail a foreshortened lifespan, as well as severe neurological impairment, physical incapacity,
repeated bodily invasions, and suffering so acute that the affected infant is simply tortured by
continued treatment.  Infants with trisomy 13 or 18 provide examples.44  Also, some children
with Tay Sachs face the prospect of dying in very early childhood after inexorably declining via
mental retardation, convulsions, blindness, and considerable pain.45  These situations involving
irremediable suffering and continuous bodily intrusions can make withholding of life support
consistent with a child’s best interests, even if precise measurement of suffering is not possible.
Extreme difficulties in assessing best interests are encountered as well in the context of
profoundly disabled adults.  Physicians and surrogates must sometimes determine the medical
fates of adults whose grave mental disability leaves them aware but uncomprehending,
permanently immobile, totally helpless, communicative only by grunts, cries, or smiles, and
whose fatal affliction leaves them dependent on constant medical intervention.46  British courts
faced such a case in 1996.47  R. was a 23 year-old so profoundly disabled that her cognitive
function was at the level of a newborn child.  She was unable to communicate verbally, but
responded to stimuli with grimaces, cries, or smiles.  She was incontinent.  Because R. had
recently lost the ability to chew, one medical issue became whether to install a gastrostomy tube. 
Her parents, who had devotedly cared for R. for 23 years, also wondered whether antibiotics
should be used to fight recurrent infections that had begun to plague R.  When physicians
petitioned for judicial guidance, the court responded that the relevant decision-making standard
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is best interests of the patient.  That meant a determination of whether, judging from the
perspective of R., her future life would be so afflicted as to be unbearable.  Using that best
interests standard, the British court ruled that a gastrostomy tube should be installed (i.e., R.’s
current level of suffering did not outweigh the benefits of her existence), that cardiopulmonary
respiration should not be instituted in the event of cardiac arrest (perhaps on the assumption that
any cardiac arrest would mark a further decline in R.’s condition so that the burdens of CPR
would exceed the benefit of life extension?), and that antibiotics could be withheld during some
future infection episode if the parents and physician then agreed that such withholding would be
in R.’s best interests (i.e., R.’s condition might deteriorate to the point when even a simple life-
sustaining intervention would be contrary to her best interests).  R.’s story helps show the
delicacy of a best interests determination in the context of some profoundly disabled and gravely
physically afflicted adults.
Another uncertainty complicates application of a best interests standard to a profoundly
disabled, fatally stricken person who is facing prospective pain and suffering during a
contemplated treatment process.  It is commonly asserted that the disabled person’s
incomprehension of the reasons for instituting painful medical interventions (i.e., failure to
understand the curative or restorative hope behind a contemplated medical intervention) will
heighten the anxiety and distress to be experienced by that person.  The National Conference of
Catholic Bishops admonishes physicians that a demented patient may find treatment “more
frightening and burdensome” than other patients.48  The spectre of heightened suffering by an
uncomprehending patient was part of the rationale of the Massachusetts court that concluded that
67 year-old Joseph Saikewicz should not receive chemotherapy for leukemia even though most
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competent patients would opt for chemo in the circumstances.  Joseph’s incomprehension about
the reasons for the needles to be used in administering chemotherapy would supposedly cause
Joseph extreme distress and agitation and would necessitate his being restrained for extended
periods of time.  He might also be distressed by side affects whose origins he would not
understand.  (Commentators have wondered, though, whether Joseph Saikewicz’s best interests
would have been better served by a trial run of chemotherapy to see whether the feared
consequences really ensued and,  if so, whether sedatives succeeded in palliating his suffering.49)
Another Massachusetts court cited the heightened burdens that a profoundly disabled woman
would experience if she were denied an abortion.  According to the judicial finding: “Normal
discomforts of pregnancy such as bladder pressure, an increasingly bulky body, and backache
would be felt as unendurable by Jane because she would not fully understand their cause.”50
These projections of heightened suffering flowing from the incomprehension of profoundly
disabled persons might be accurate, but they might also be the product of speculation fueled by a
surrogate’s projection of imagined feelings or by negative perceptions of the patient’s worth.
In short, while a best interests standard for surrogate medical decisionmaking makes theoretical
sense, its application to profoundly disabled patients is complicated by difficulties of assessment
and measurement of patients’ feelings and emotions.  And that problem of applying a best
interests standard is compounded if the patient’s intrinsic human dignity becomes part of a best
interests calculus.
Quality of Life, Dignity, and Never-competent Persons
The 1983 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine listed
“quality as well as the extent of the life sustained” as an element within a best interests of the
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patient standard.51  Following that lead, a number of court opinions mention quality of life (or
human dignity) as a relevant factor to be used by a surrogate in assessing an incapacitated
patient’s best interests when making end-of-life treatment determinations.52  A few state statutes
explicitly mention dignity in the same context.53  I submit that quality of life entails more than
weighing benefits and burdens -- the delicate task of measuring and balancing feelings and
emotions described in the last section -- in severely debilitated patients.  It includes a
determination of whether the patient’s deterioration is so extreme that life has become
intrinsically undignified.
The importance of quality of life and avoidance of extreme indignity is easily
understandable with regard to formerly competent persons.  Most competent people care
mightily about quality of life within the dying process.  That concern was a major force behind
the death with dignity movement that has been active in the United States for more than 30 years. 
People commonly fear that grave debilitation -- particularly, severe dementia -- will entail
embarrassment and/or frustration stemming from helplessness, dependence, and incapacity. 
Even if these distasteful feelings might not materialize, people care about the image and
memories that they will leave behind, images in the minds of loved ones that may be soiled by
the patient’s extreme mental and physical deterioration during the dying process.  These common
preoccupations with indignity in the dying process are readily observable in the context of
competent patients contemplating their prospective medical fates -- in decisions to reject life-
sustaining medical interventions, in advance medical directives, and in attitudinal surveys
showing “paramount importance [attached to] . . . functional independence and the maintenance
of mental faculties.”54  Afflicted patients seeking access to assisted suicide are often motivated by
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a desire to avoid helplessness and indignity, rather than avoidance of pain.  Justice Souter in
Glucksberg portrayed the petitioning dying patients as seeking “an end to their short remaining
lives with a dignity that they believed would be denied them by powerful pain medication, as
well as by their consciousness of dependency and helplessness as they approached death.”55
Justice Stevens in Glucksberg accepted the notion that a person’s interests in dignity in the dying
process and in shaping the legacy of memories that survives might well qualify as a fundamental
aspect of liberty.56
Some commentators question the relevance of the concept of indignity to the handling of
profoundly disabled persons.  One objection is that any indignity -- in the form of embarrassment
or humiliation -- will not actually be experienced by a gravely incapacitated patient and that it
cannot be demeaning or degrading to suffer debilitation, especially if others are providing loving,
life-supporting care to a human being.57  That objection seems short-sighted to me.  Unsensed
invasions of personal interests, including affronts to dignity, may be terribly offensive even if
unsensed.  What about the performance of unconsented medical experiments, or harvesting of
non-vital tissue, or sexual molestation with regard to even insensate, dying patients?  Wouldn’t
those actions be deemed clearly violative of important dignity interests?  What would we think
about administration of medical care that violates a now-incompetent (and insensate) patient’s
religious precepts?  Joel Feinberg correctly notes that incapacitated beings can be victimized by
“harms” to their interests (even if unsensed) as well as by “hurts” that are experienced.  In short,
a profoundly disabled person has important dignity interests whether or not the person actually
senses invasions of those interests.
A stronger objection to use of the concept of indignity in the death and dying context is
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that the concept’s imprecision and subjectivity would engender arbitrariness and abuse by
surrogates making end-of-life decisons for the profoundly disabled.  This concern about
exploitation of vulnerable persons led to the policy pursuant to which a few states barred
terminal surrogate decisions absent clearcut prior expressions.  Recall Judge Wachtler’s
admonition in a 1988 case involving continuation of life support for an elderly woman left barely
conscious by a series of strokes: “No person or court should substitute its judgment as to what
would be an acceptable quality of life for another.”58  Recall also the previously mentioned
problem of perspective -- the concern that able-bodied surrogates might project distorted visions
of intolerable quality of life (grounded on their own baseline notions of function necessary to a
dignified existence) onto their incapacitated wards.  Surrogates might be subject to the ignorance
and prejudice that frequently characterize public attitudes toward gravely incapacitated persons.
That certainly occurred in the previously mentioned 1982 Indiana case in which an Indiana
couple determined to withhold lifesaving treatment from their Down’s syndrome infant.  Another
fear is that judgments about intolerable quality of life would mask social worth assessments
along the lines employed by the Nazis in their euthanasia program.  A surrogate’s quality of life
judgment evokes in some people the fearful notion of a life not worth living, a notion that would
supposedly jeopardize the well being of helpless persons and undermine respect for the sanctity
of life.59
The spectre of abuse of quality of life judgments seems easy enough to curb in the
context of previously competent persons.  First, some people provide living wills or other prior
expressions that articulate their personal vision of an intolerable quality of life -- a level of
deterioration which that person would deem intolerably undignified.  Implementation of a
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person’s expressed value preferences may not always be easy -- given the frequent imprecision of
advance directives -- but surrounding medical personnel can at least use the prior expressions in
monitoring surrogate decisions to assure that a surrogate is acting consistently with the now-
incompetent patient’s expressed values.  Second, even without advance expressions, we know a
lot about how competent people regard an intolerable quality of life for themselves, at least in
certain post-competence scenarios.  For example, polls and surveys consistently show that at
least 90% of people would not want to be given life-sustaining medical intervention if mired in a
permanently unconscious state.  Similarly, most people recoil at the prospect of lingering in a
barely conscious state in which they no longer recognize or interact in a meaningful fashion with
their loved ones or surrounding caregivers.60  And gravely debilitated patients may begin to act in
ways so antithetical to their previous values and character as to support a surrogate’s judgment
that the previously competent patient would deem the deteriorated status intolerably
undignified.61   The point is that surrogate decisionmakers have some foundation -- grounded
either in the now-incompetent patient’s personal preferences and values or in consensus
preferences that people have toward their own prospective end-of-life treatment -- for making
some judgments about an intolerable quality of life with regard to previously competent persons. 
Understandings about common preferences toward indignity in the dying process enable medical
personnel to monitor the behavior of surrogate decisionmakers.  Health care providers can refuse
to cooperate with surrogate decisions that deviate either from the patient’s demonstrated values
or from common attitudes about indignity.  Part of professional responsibility is to show fidelity
to the patient’s vision of a humane and dignified dying process.
The harder issue is whether sufficient understandings exist about the concept of
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intolerable indignity as applied to profoundly disabled persons -- never-competent beings. 
Certainly, dignity cannot mean the same thing for a never-competent, profoundly disabled person
as for a previously competent person.62  Take incontinence as an example.  That condition might
represent utter humiliation for a competent or previously competent person, yet not embarrass or
particularly trouble a profoundly disabled person.  The same goes for extreme dementia.  While a
previously acute person might experience frustration, anxiety, and embarrassment from a
precipitous decline in mental faculties, the lifelong profoundly disabled person might have no
similar feelings.63  Meaningful emotional relationships can exist for a person without even near-
normal intelligence so long as some ability to interact with others is present.
Every person’s concept of personal dignity is shaped in part by his or her circumstances
and experiences.  The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law comments in this vein:
“While some adults who were once fully capable might not want to live with severe mental
handicaps, adults who are profoundly retarded have never known or aspired to a different kind of
life.”64  A person who has always had extremely limited cognitive function thus may have
modest expectations about quality of life.  Existence as a locus of pleasure and pain may fulfill
their interest in dignity.  Indeed, the concept of a minimally acceptable quality of life is entirely
beyond the ken of a profoundly disabled person.  In the absence of notions of intolerable
indignity formed by the affected individuals themselves, or people similarly situated, how can
surrogate decisionmakers  apply the concept of indignity to profoundly disabled persons?
My response is that intrinsic human dignity can be sufficiently defined to play a
legitimate, if limited, role in end-of-life decisionmaking on behalf of the profoundly disabled. 
Respect for all persons includes upholding their intrinsic or basic human dignity.  The critical
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task is to give content to the notion of intrinsic human dignity, in the sense of a minimally
acceptable quality of life, without jeopardizing the well being of helpless human beings.  Bruce
Jennings suggests that any “dying person has a right to a certain quality of living while dying.”65
I concur in his notion that certain dying conditions can be so inhumane as to constitute “a moral
trespass upon personhood.”66  And I agree that pain, suffering, intrusive bodily invasions,
protracted physical restraint, and mental deterioration to a point of non-recognition of the
surrounding environment are relevant indices in assessing intolerable trespasses upon human
integrity.
A recent case illustrates the relevance of extreme indignity to a determination of best
interests.67  Nicholas Truselo, a 3 month old child, had suffered extensive brain trauma from an
adult’s shaking (shaken baby impact syndrome).  According to the physicians’ assessment,
Nicholas would never be able to walk, speak, see, or communicate.  He would be dependent on
constant medical intervention.  In deciding that Nicholas’ best interests dictated removal of life
support (a ventilator and nasogastric table), the court relied heavily on the child’s dismal quality
of life.  Judge Ableman explained:
Nicholas will never stand, sit, eat, walk, speak, read, write, think, or exist without
constant care for even the most basic of life’s functions.  He will be confined to his bed
and will suffer constant lung infections because of his virtually non-existent gag reflex. 
He will never be able to communicate joy, fear, happiness, or sadness, will never be able
to form relationships with others, and will live with tubes, machines, and other
specialized medical care.  He will never react to his surrounding environment, will never
give or receive love, and may be subjected to substantial pain and discomfort.  The
physicians have evaluated the child’s condition and have concluded that a future
sustained by radical medical treatment, and entailing virtually no quality of life, is not a
valued alternative, despite its effectiveness in extending life or delaying death.
While Judge Ableman mentioned pain, it seemed to be indignity and quality of life that prompted
his best interests determination.  The most obvious element of indignity was Nicholas’ total
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inability to relate to his environment.
The understandable apprehension -- already mentioned -- is that human dignity is too
imprecise a concept to be useful, especially in the setting of end-of-life decisionmaking for a
vulnerable population like the lifelong profoundly disabled.  The concept of human dignity is
used in diverse ways and in a variety of contexts.  Some jurists, for example, see human dignity
as a concept helping to shape several aspects of fundamental liberty --  for example, protection
against excessively harsh punishment or against intolerable invasion of physical and emotional
privacy.  Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall often invoked
human dignity as a basis for recognizing civil and political rights for which they were
advocating, including freedom of expression and freedom of conscience.  Other social observers
use the concept of human dignity to evoke a utopian notion of affirmative social obligations
toward disadvantaged communities, including provision of sufficient resources to allow
maximum development of individual capacities.68  Another vision of human dignity precludes
using a person solely as a means to advance the well being of others.  These diverse perspectives
on human dignity confirm the elusiveness of the concept.  Yet that doesn’t mean that the concept
is inherently unmanageable any more than other important but elusive notions such as liberty,
justice, fairness, and equality.  (Indeed, concepts of liberty, fairness, and equality have
considerable application in American jurisprudence.)
One mark of the imprecision of the concept of human dignity is the fact that, in the
context of end-of-life decisionmaking for incapacitated persons, human dignity is sometimes
used to support diametrically opposed approaches.  Take, for example, the handling of a patient
who has permanently deteriorated to a point of semi-consciousness, no longer aware of, or
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art24
-23-
interacting with, his or her environment and dependent on artificial nutrition and hydration
(ANH) for subsistence.  One perspective is that this formally vital individual is being denied
basic human dignity by continuation of life support and prolongation of a degrading dying
process.  The contrary perspective is that respect for human dignity -- the intrinsic worth and
equality of every human being -- demands that nurture in the form of ANH be continued for the
helpless being.  Given such disparate views of human dignity, and given the pluralistic nature of
American society, how can intrinsic human dignity be meaningfully used in end-of-life surrogate
decisionmaking?     
One useful source of content for intrinsic human dignity is constitutional jurisprudence.
While the federal Constitution does not explicitly mention  human dignity, the concept of human
dignity provides an important “background norm” and aid in the interpretation of various
constitutional rights.69  An example is found in the jurisprudence surrounding the 8th
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.  In 1958, Chief Justice Warren
called human dignity the “foundation” of the 8th Amendment and insisted that the amendment’s
meaning must be drawn from “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”70  (Warren then ruled that government imposition of statelessness as a
punishment involves such psychic torture as to be constitutionally impermissible).  In 1976, the
Supreme Court employed the human dignity norm in finding that a correctional institution’s
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs is violative of the 8th Amendment.71
These cases illustrate the close connection between human dignity and evolving constitutional 
norms shaped by decent and humane social treatment -- a theme repeated beyond the 8th
Amendment context.
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The link between intrinsic human dignity and constitutional jurisprudence appears in the
application of other parts of the Constitution.  The Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures evinces a concern with dignity reflected by the Amendment’s restriction of
government access to personal space and information.  That dignity concern emerges particularly
sharply in cases involving bodily integrity.  In rejecting some government efforts to penetrate the
body in order to secure criminal evidence, the justices have expressed strong solicitude for
personal control over the private space that is the human body.72  The Supreme Court “sees
human dignity implicated in government appropriation of the body by touching, undressing, or
penetrating the body.”73  This is not to say that all government invasions of the body are
constitutionally prohibited; cases upholding government intrusions such as vaccination and
collection of blood samples (from drivers involved in accidents) contradict that notion.  Yet even
the cases upholding such intrusions recognize a close tie between human dignity and bodily
integrity and therefore demand strong governmental justification before allowing bodily
invasions.
A classic case, Rochin v. California,74 illustrates that the judicial distaste for bodily
searches is grounded on a dignity-based revulsion toward forced bodily invasions.  In Rochin,
police forcibly pumped the stomach of a suspected narcotics dealer in order to preserve evidence. 
The Supreme Court threw out the evidence not because of police disregard for the niceties of the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but because the police conduct “shocked the
conscience.”  The forced stomach pumping was too revolting to the justices’ sense of dignity. 
The Court’s solicitude for bodily integrity (and associated dignity) as an element of liberty also
surfaced in cases in the 1990's.  Cruzan in 1990 and Glucksberg in 1997 together established that
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a competent person has a right to reject even life-sustaining medical intervention.  Part of the
basis for that liberty is traditional respect for bodily integrity and accompanying revulsion toward
the spectacle of forcing an unwilling person to receive treatment.  Justice O’Connor explicitly
commented on the human degradation associated with forced treatment in her concurring opinion
in Cruzan and several other courts have noted how forced medical treatment offends basic human
dignity.75  The intolerable degradation stems from several elements - - the overriding of the
patient’s will, the unwanted bodily invasion, and the distasteful restraints necessary to overcome
a resisting patient’s will.
Of course, acknowledgment of an important interest in bodily integrity as an aspect of
human dignity does not help much in understanding the scope of a profoundly disabled person’s
intrinsic human dignity.  In the first place, no person’s right to preserve bodily integrity is
absolute.  The same constitutional jurisprudence that recognizes an important interest in bodily
integrity also recognizes that various competing interests can sometimes prevail in a balancing
process.  For example, public health can justify compulsory vaccination, public safety can
warrant blood alcohol tests, and well-founded needs of law enforcement can sometimes justify
searches of bodily cavities or even surgical intrusions.  In those instances, competing interests
override the normal revulsion toward forced bodily intrusions.  More importantly, the welfare
interests of an incapacitated person often provide a legitimate basis for overriding that person’s
will even if this entails what would otherwise be deemed an undignified  and repulsive bodily
invasion.  Forced medication of mentally incapacitated persons whose conduct endangers
themselves or others provides one illustration.76  Another example is the common medical
practice of providing critical treatment for a small child or a mentally disabled adult -- where
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such treatment strongly advances the interests of the patient -- despite the patient’s objections
and even resistance.  In short, while a profoundly disabled person has a strong dignity-based
interest in bodily integrity, preservation of that person’s life or promotion of that person’s well
being will often provide a sufficient justification for a forced bodily invasion.  Again, the
problem often boils down to the measurement and weighing of the profoundly disabled person’s
various interests, i.e., determining whether the burdens of continued existence (including impact
from the contemplated medical intervention) outweigh the benefits.
Another  link between human dignity and the Constitution emerges in the jurisprudence
interpreting the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment liberty.  In elevating certain personal
prerogatives to “fundamental” liberty status, the Court has stressed constitutional respect for
intimate choices “central to dignity and autonomy.”77  This theme has surfaced in the
reproductive rights context (with its link to control over the human body) and in the right to
reject life-sustaining medical intervention (with another link to bodily integrity).78  In short,
establishing that any particular aspect of self-determination or personal status is integral to
human dignity provides a strong impetus for ranking that element high within the jurisprudence
of constitutional liberty.79
All this testifies to a strong connection between human dignity and constitutional
jurisprudence implementing certain constitutional provisions.  Is that jurisprudence, in turn,
translatable into norms that could shape or inform a concept of intrinsic human dignity
applicable to profoundly disabled persons whose medical fates are being determined by
surrogates?  To some extent, the constitutional treatment of dignity merely reinforces norms that
already prevail in the medical decisionmaking context as discussed earlier under the heading of
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measuring the patient’s well being.  One norm established there -- that persistent and unremitting
suffering saps human dignity and can serve as an important guide to surrogate decisionmaking
pursuant to a best interests standard -- is amply reinforced in the constitutional jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court has relied in several contexts on the notion that extreme suffering intolerably
degrades persons.  For example, the unnecessary infliction of pain associated with failure to meet
prison inmates’ serious medical needs was a key element in the Court’s determination that such
failure could violate the 8th Amendment.80  Concern about unnecessary suffering also prompted
the comments by five Justices in Glucksberg in 1997 that any state barriers to effective pain
relief would impinge on a dying patient’s fundamental liberty interests and might even prompt a
reconsideration of the Court’s position that state bans on assisted suicide were constitutional.81
Some commentators have suggested that the concurring Justices in Glucksberg were implicitly
announcing a constitutional “right to be free of unnecessary pain and suffering at the end of
life.”82  All this judicial sensitivity to extreme suffering confirms that best interests doctrine -- in
allowing the withdrawal of life support from persons suffering irremediably -- draws on and is
fully consistent with intrinsic human dignity.  (The problem, as noted earlier, comes more in
applying the doctrine -- i.e., in assessing when suffering outweighs any pleasures and
satisfactions in a profoundly disabled person’s existence).  
The incapacitated patient’s dignity interest complicates the balancing process entailed in
the best interests formula.  If a profoundly disabled patient is stricken with life-threatening
cancer and will have to be physically or chemically restrained during administration of
chemotherapy, how much should the offense to dignity count in the surrogate’s decision whether
to initiate treatment?  Presumably, not much if the forced restraint will be temporary or sporadic
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and much more if the restraint will be prolonged.  Presumably, the offense to dignity should
count more if the patient will experience frustration and anxiety from struggle against the
restraints.  The percentage chance of significant remission and the potential duration of remission
are relevant variables as well.  We know that the degradation of a forced bodily invasion does not
always violate intrinsic human dignity, but sometimes it does.
So far, I have suggested that dignity matters for a profoundly disabled person even when
that person cannot appreciate any affront to dignity.  At the same time, I concede that the dignity
interest is ordinarily so hard to quantify and to factor into the best interests formula that it would
seldom be determinative of a dying person’s fate.  Are there circumstances where a never-
competent person’s status is so intrinsically demeaning that the dignity interest alone -- separate
from any interest in avoidance of suffering -- would justify removal of artificial life support?  
I think that permanent unconsciousness represents one such circumstance.  Permanent
insentience -- permanent inability to relate to a person’s environment, to interact with fellow
humans, or to experience any of the pleasures associated with human existence -- constitutes an
intrinsically undignified status for a human being.  This is so whether the permanent
unconsciousness comes about at the beginning of life, as with an anencephalic infant, or at its
conclusion, as when a formerly conscious person deteriorates to a permanently vegetative state. 
In both instances, a surrogate decision to maintain artificial life support ought not be permissible
because of the affront to intrinsic human dignity.  
Some support exists for this notion of permanent unconsciousness as intrinsically
undignified.  Certainly, numerous cases – starting in 1976 with the Quinlan case in New Jersey –  
uphold surrogate determinations to end life support for permanently unconscious persons.83
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Sometimes, the articulated judicial rationale is that allowing the permanently insensate patient to
die promotes that patient’s best interests.  Is that surrogate prerogative to end the permanently
unconscious person’s existence consistent with the customary legal requirement that surrogate
action be confined to a person’s best interests?  Superficially, the answer would appear to be no,
for a permanently unconscious person’s interests, albeit extremely limited, would still seem to be
in continued life.  There is always some infinitesmal chance that a misdiagnosis has occurred or
that a miracle will happen and the person will regain consciousness.  The insensate person is not
in pain (so far as known).84  Moreover, while we assume that the person lacking neo-cortical
function is experiencing no positive feelings, we cannot know that.  Withdrawal of life support
does not seem to advance the tangible best interests of a permanently unconscious person.  If not
best interests, what accounts for a surrogate decisionmaker’s legal prerogative to let the
permanently unconscious person die?
As to formerly competent persons now mired in permanent unconsciousness, the
justification for surrogate decisions to remove life support can be found in an effort to honor the
patient’s likely preferences.  Numerous surveys, as well as examination of preferences expressed
in advance medical directives, establish that the vast majority of competent persons would not
want to be maintained in a permanently unconscious state.  A decision to remove life support
from a permanently unconscious, previously competent person therefore accomplishes what that
person would very likely have wanted to be done in the circumstances.  In effect, the surrogate is
effectuating the previously competent patient’s autonomy interest as best that can be done -- by
making a substituted judgment about what the now-incompetent patient would want done if able
to choose.  In the absence of explicit instructions or other indicia of the now-incompetent
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patient’s actual wishes, the best way to honor self-determination is by constructing the patient’s
likely preferences based on knowledge of what most people would want in the circumstances.85
An alternative explanation for removing life support from a permanently unconscious
person might be that the interests of loved ones in avoiding the emotional and financial costs of a
protracted death watch justify the decision to terminate care. Some commentators assert that the
interests of others, such as surrounding family and care givers, account for judicial willingness to
endorse removal of life support from permanently unconscious persons.  No court articulates that
rationale, though it would be consistent with my suggestion later that the interests of third parties
influence surrogate “best interests” determinations at the margins.  The margin here is permanent
unconsciousness, a point where the patient’s actual interests (including a tiny chance of regaining
consciousness) are problematic at best.  As to previously competent persons, this marginal
consideration of loved ones’ interests is also consistent with the patients’ likely wishes.  (Most
people don’t want their loved ones to be subjected to heavy burdens during a protracted death
watch while the dying person is in a permanently unconscious state).  
I have another explanation for the wide acceptance of surrogate decisions to remove life
support from permanently unconscious persons, even from persons such as children or
profoundly disabled beings who have never been competent.  My view is that permanent
unconsciousness is an intrinsically undignified state for any human being, so that being allowed
to die is respectful of the unconscious patient’s human dignity.  Judges understand the intrinsic
indignity of a permanently unconscious status and are therefore willing to uphold surrogate
decisions to withdraw further treatment in that circumstance.  Some cases involving permanent
unconsciousness explicitly cite quality of life and human dignity while endorsing removal of life
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art24
-31-
support.86  I would also suggest that surrogate respect for intrinsic human dignity is part of a
never-competent patient’s interests even if the patient can no longer experience the consequences
of demeaning treatment.  Indeed, respect for human dignity is what insulates the never-
competent patient from regularly being subjected to bodily invasions such as tissue harvesting or
hazardous medical experimentation that would benefit others.87  In short, the legal handling of
end-of-life decisions on behalf of permanently unconscious patients accords those patients full
moral status (by implementing intrinsic human dignity) even though the surrogate is permitted to
let the patient die.
If a permanently unconscious status is intrinsically undignified, is a surrogate obligated to
opt for removal of life support from such an incapacitated ward?  The answer under prevailing
law and custom is clearly no.  The Cruzan case, discussed earlier, upheld Missouri’s insistence
that Nancy Beth Cruzan’s permanently unconscious life be preserved (absent clear evidence of
her contrary wishes).  And the Baby K case upheld a mother’s determination to continue life
support to her anencephalic infant.  While numerous cases and statutes uphold a surrogate
decision to remove life support from a PVS patient, none declare that a surrogate must follow
that course.  Estimates are that thousands of PVS patients are regularly maintained in the United
States by continued medical intervention. All this confirms that current law does not regard a
surrogate’s conduct as abusive if the surrogate chooses to preserve a permanently unconscious
patient’s existence.  
My own position diverges from the prevailing law.  Because I regard permanent
unconsciousness as intrinsically undignified, I would make removal of life support from a
permanently unconscious person mandatory unless, in the case of a previously competent patient,
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that patient had indicated a wish to be preserved in such a demeaning status.  My exception for
the expressed will of a previously competent person is debatable.  Sometimes, when society
outlaws an inherently inhumane practice such as slavery, it allows no exceptions for consent.  On
the other hand, we sometimes allow people to choose conditions that most other people would
regard as intrinsically demeaning.  Lois Shepherd points out that people can choose to be
undignified -- for example, by groveling.88  People can self-submit to horribly inhumane
relationships.  And people whose religion or philosophy values all human life, no matter how
degrading, ought probably to be able to choose preservation in a permanently unconscious state. 
(This is so as long as their resources last; I am not suggesting that public funds must be devoted
to preserving a permanently unconscious state).  In the absence of such personal choices to
accept what is generally regarded as an undignified status, I would require that a surrogate
respect intrinsic human dignity by allowing a permanently unconscious person to die.
My suggested framework would make the controversial Wanglie case correctly decided. 
There, a husband as guardian successfully fought to maintain ANH for his permanently
unconscious 86 year-old wife.  (The wife’s hospital had sought a court order to remove the
husband as guardian on the basis that he was improperly insisting on “futile” care for his wife). 
The judge upheld the husband’s guardianship because the husband purported to be implementing
his wife’s articulated religious beliefs that all life is sacred and ought to be preserved.  Under my
suggested framework, Ms. Wanglie’s religiously based preference was properly upheld even
though it involved submission to an intrinsically undignified status.  If she never made such a
choice or never embraced such values, then her husband should indeed have been removed as
guardian and Ms. Wanglie should have been relieved from her intrinsically undignified state by
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removal of life support.  
Notice that the option to extend a permanently unconscious existence would not apply to
a never-competent person, a lifelong profoundly disabled person.  Denial of an option of
choosing (more precisely, having a surrogate make a choice on the disabled patient’s behalf) an
intrinsically undignified existence does not seem to me to be a serious disadvantage or harm. 
The denial reflects a notion that no one ought to be subjected to an intrinsically undignified
status without explicit consent.  A choice of degradation can only be made volitionally (just as a
choice of marital partner can only be made volitionally and is therefore excluded from surrogate
control).  Generally, the difficulty of defining intrinsic indignity for a never-competent person
protects that person against premature termination of life support.  The profoundly disabled
person “benefits” from a tighter standard of indignity than that applied to a previously competent
person.  That is, a possibly degrading condition -- like extreme dementia or incontinence -- is
more likely to be deemed intolerably undignified pursuant to the actual values of a previously
competent patient or pursuant to constructive choice on behalf of a previously competent person
than by notions of intrinsic indignity.  In other words, any notion of intrinsic indignity covering a
never-competent person would be narrow.  So far, only a few conditions -- permanent
unconsciousness, mental decline to a semi-conscious state where the person can no longer
recognize and relate to others, and serious irremediable suffering -- might be classified by
reference to contemporary norms as an intrinsically undignified status.  And current law and
practice have not yet reached a consensus even as to permanent unconsciousness.
Admittedly, my approach to intrinsic indignity -- making removal of a permanently
unconscious patient’s life support mandatory (absent contrary preferences by a previously
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competent person) -- is contrary to prevailing practice.  Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect society
to label artificial preservation of life support as an inhumane, intrinsically demeaning practice --
at least in any circumstance other than extreme, unremitting suffering.   Government is
understandably hesitant to impose its views of intrinsic indignity when the consequence is to
force the death of live beings (by removal of life support).  This is especially so in a pluralistic
society where cultural and religious attitudes toward permanently unconscious beings may vary. 
But perhaps it is only a matter of time.  A societal consensus has been reached that a human
being is dead when all brain function has ceased, even though nails and hair continue to grow
and hormonal secretions take place and the heart and lungs could continue to function for months
or years via artificial maintenance.  A similar consensus may evolve that permanent
unconsciousness (with no upper brain function), while not identical to death, constitutes an
intrinsically undignified existence that ought not be artifically extended.89
Must Medical Decisions Be in the “Best” Interests of a Profoundly Disabled Person?
The typical understanding is that a best interests judgment requires maximizing the
helpless ward’s interest or determining “the highest benefit [for the ward] among available
options.”90  I suggest that definition is not always accurate.  Although “best interests” is the
common watchword when government acts within its parens patriae authority to supervise the
handling of helpless populations, a surrogate decision on behalf of a profoundly disabled person
does not always have to be the best choice for the disabled person.  Sometimes, a surrogate
determination need only be reasonably consistent with the interests of the disabled person -- an
appropriate choice within several acceptable options.  And sometimes a surrogate’s
determination need meet an even less restrictive standard -- that the determination not be abusive
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in the sense of subjecting the dependent person to serious risk of harm.  The most obvious
situation where a less restrictive standard than “best” interests applies is where a profoundly
disabled person is being cared for at home, i.e., is being raised as part of a family unit by a parent
or parents.  
American custom and law give parents considerable dominion over their children.  In
part, this tradition is grounded on the assumption that parents will generally act benevolently
toward their children.  
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s
difficult decisions.  More importantly, historically it [the law] has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.91
But neither law nor tradition compel parents to adhere to a child’s best interest.  In myriad
circumstances, parents are free to disadvantage or even harm a child without violating legal
bounds.  
One area in which parents are free to deviate from their children’s best interests relates to
child custody itself.  Numerous decisions confirm that natural parents are entitled to custody
even where their children’s interests would be better served by remaining with foster parents or
with aspiring adoptive parents.92  A similar parental prerogative to deviate from best interests (in
a fashion short of serious neglect or abuse) applies to a multitude of child-rearing decisions.  This
principle covers formal and informal education, social interactions, allocation of household
responsibilities, and distribution of rewards, benefits, and sanctions within the family.  “Even
though we often talk about doing what is best, it is clear that the courts and the American public
do not really believe that such a high standard is necessary or even appropriate.”93  Parental
autonomy allows subordination of the best interests of a child to family well being, to sibling
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well being, to religious dictates, or to philosophical preferences guiding parental dominion
(again, short of serious neglect or abuse).  The Supreme Court has acknowledged this societal
deference to parental control:
[T]he best interests of the child is not the legal standard that governs parents’ or
guardians’ exercise of their custody: so long as certain minimum requirements of child
care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other
children or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves.94
Many rationales support the social policy of broad deference to parents in child rearing. 
As noted, there is an underlying assumption that parents will generally act in a benevolent
fashion toward their offspring.  At the same time, parental control of child rearing advances a
social interest in pluralism -- an interest in cultivating a diverse range of cultural and ideological
perspectives.95  Parental control is also perceived as an efficient mechanism for raising children. 
The practical reality is that government would not have the resources to control child-rearing
decisions even if it thought that it could do a better job than many parents.  And there is
considerable doubt whether government could or would do a sounder job of child rearing (or of
close supervision of child rearing) even if it possessed the resources for such an undertaking.96  In
short, parental autonomy serves a useful social function in facilitating the upbringing and
socialization of successive generations of citizens.
  The federal Constitution also insulates parental decisionmaking in some measure from
governmental interference.  Parental autonomy in child rearing is recognized by the Supreme
Court as a fundamental aspect of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court’s
solicitude for the parental role dates back to its 1923 decision in Meyer v. Nebraska97 striking
down a state law prohibiting both the teaching of a subject in a foreign language and the teaching
of a foreign language and acknowledging the important parental liberty interest in raising
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children.  Although Meyer was a product of an era of aggressive judicial intervention confining
governmental management of economic and social affairs generally, its solicitude for parental
autonomy has endured.  Supreme Court opinions continue to acknowledge “a fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their children.”98
The most recent confirmation of parents’ fundamental right “to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children” came in April 2000 in Troxel v
Granville.99   There, the Court considered a parent’s substantive due process challenge to a
Washington statute permitting “any person” to petition for a visitation order (in the face of
parental opposition to such visitation) and authorizing a judge to grant visitation if the court
determines that visitation would serve the best interests of the child in issue.  The Washington
courts had struck down the statute as an impermissible interference with parental liberty both
because it allowed any person to petition (not just an especially bonded or connected person) and
because it supplanted parental judgment without any prerequisite finding of significant harm to
the child flowing from the parental decision regarding visitation.  By a 6 to 3 margin, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Washington statute was unconstitutional, at least as it had been
interpreted and applied in the case at hand.  Justice O’Connor spoke for a four justice plurality in
Troxel.  She declined to decide whether the due process clause requires a threshold showing of
substantial harm before a court can constitutionally interfere with a parental decision regarding
visitation.  She did find a constitutional defect in the statute’s failure to give any “special weight”
to the parental determination about the advisability of visitation.100  Justice O’Connor declared
that the due process clause precludes state interference with childrearing simply because a judge
believes that a better decision than the parent’s could have been made.  In other words, the
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Washington statute’s deficiency was its failure to accord any deference to the parental judgment
regarding visitation to children.101
Constitutional jurisprudence  regarding parental decisionmaking is somewhat in
disarray.102  In theory, parental autonomy, as a fundamental liberty, is insulated against
government interference unless government meets a strict scrutiny standard of judicial review --
a standard requiring government to demonstrate a compelling interest in the particular
interference and a showing that the government intervention is carefully tailored to accomplish
its object.  Yet in application of constitutional doctrine the Court has sustained a wide variety of
state impingements upon parental autonomy aimed at promoting children’s welfare or public
health.  A constant tension exists between judicial concern for parental liberty to control the
family and judicial respect for various other interests including the state’s parens patriae role as
protector of children’s welfare.  Judicial respect for government’s parens patriae role has
contributed to the Supreme Court’s upholding of compulsory education, compulsory
innoculations, and prohibition of child labor, to cite a few interferences with parental control that
have withstood constitutional challenge.  In such instances, the Court seems to resolve the
tension between parental autonomy and children’s welfare with an ad hoc balancing approach
rather than a careful application of strict scrutiny doctrine.
Another interest justifying interference with parental dominion is promotion of older
children’s self-determination.  Some states have sought to promote the self-determination
interests of adolescents and teenagers by creating a “mature minor” exception to the normal
parental prerogative to control health decisions on behalf of children.103  Some states have also
encouraged physicians to provide certain sensitive treatments, such as for venereal disease and
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substance abuse, without parental authorization.104  And the Supreme Court has given mature
minors a constitutional right to control their own fates regarding abortion.105
The bottom line appears to be that government may interfere with parental dominion  in
order to advance a variety of significant interests, especially children’s welfare.  To answer the
question posed but left unanswered by Justice O’Connor in Troxel, states are probably not
constitutionally required to demonstrate particularized, substantial harm to children as a
prerequisite to interference in parental control of child rearing.  The state may make categorical
interventions to protect children’s well being, as in the case of child labor laws and as in the case
of a ban on parental  consent to non-therapeutic medical experimentation carrying more than
minimal risk for never-competent patients.
What implications flow from this constitutional jurisprudence upon parental control of
medical decisions regarding children obviously incapable of making their own medical
decisions?  In large part, states conform to the constitutional framework by recognizing a
fundamental liberty interest in child rearing and leaving medical decisions in the hands of
parents.  Absent an emergency situation, medical personnel commit a battery (a tortious
touching) by performing medical procedures without parental consent.  This principle applies to
a wide range of medical interventions from medication for small problems to surgical invasions
for serious conditions-- subject to the forementioned exceptions for mature minors and for
certain sensitive medical issues such as abortion.  
Note that the parental prerogative to control medical decisions for minors (as recognized
in state jurisprudence) does not ordinarily confine parents to choosing treatments in the best
interests of the child, i.e., the objectively best medical course.  As many commentators have
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recognized, medical circumstances often yield a range of plausible approaches;106 parents are
certainly entitled to select from this range of reasonable medical responses.  But the deference
toward parental choice goes further than this in many jurisdictions.  Some courts uphold parental
choice  among alternative approaches so long as the chosen course is “not totally rejected by
responsible medical authority.”107  This means, for example, that a parent of a profoundly
disabled child can opt for a more dangerous, professionally disfavored course of medical
intervention because it would be more palatable to the child  (more sensitive to the child’s
emotional well being).108  Other jurisdictions express their deference to parental medical
decisions by refusing to intervene unless a decision is “clearly contrary” to the child’s best
interests.109  Most jurisdictions make government interference with parental medical decisions
contingent upon a showing of serious harm to the child,110  meaning harm serious enough to
constitute child neglect or abuse.  This approach recognizes “the paramount right of parents to
decide questions affecting the welfare of their children until such right is forfeited by neglect.”111
This state deference to parental decisionmaking leaves limited room for parents to
interpose religious and cultural beliefs (and perhaps familial interests) into medical decisions on
behalf of their children.  For example, a Jehovah’s Witness parent opting for bloodless surgery
(meaning no transfusion of blood products) may be selecting a medically disfavored course in
order to save the child patient’s soul by obeying what the parent perceives as a divine injunction. 
States tolerate such an option so long as the choice does not seriously threaten the child’s life or
well being to the point of constituting child neglect.  Many states explicitly provide some sort of
exemption from child abuse prosecution for parents opting for spiritual healing techniques.112
Parents opting for circumcision of their infants provide another illustration of tolerable parental
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choices influenced by religious or cultural values that deviate from a child’s best medical
interests.113  Again, so long as serious harm to the child is not threatened, parents are generally
allowed flexibility in making medical choices for their offspring even if the choices deviate from
the child’s best interests.
In contrast to this deference to parental choice in a wide range of medical decisions, states
commonly identify certain classes of “critical” medical decisions where a strict best interests
standard is judicially applied.  These critical determinations include abortion, sterilization, organ
or tissue donation, and (in most instances) withholding or withdrawal of life support.  These
areas are singled out as problematic either because of the intrinsic danger (withdrawal of life
support and electroconvulsive therapy), concern about obvious conflicts of loyalties (organ
donations to siblings), a history of exploitation surrounding the medical procedure (sterilization),
or the critical constitutional interest at stake (abortion).  Parental choice is displaced in these
areas (with the exception of end-of-life decisions in many jurisdictions) and the critical medical
decision is assigned to the courts.  Judges, in turn, are supposed to make an independent
determination of the child-patient’s best interests -- meaning selection of the best course for the
child -- before authorizing one of these controversial medical interventions.  Even when a critical
medical issue is left to parents rather than a court -- as is the case with end-of-life
decisionmaking in many jurisdictions -- the articulated standard is usually declared to be best
interests of the patient.
Sterilization decisions on behalf of disabled persons provide an illustration of judicial
application of a strict best interests standard.  The shady history of eugenic sterilization, with
senseless sterilization of thousands of Americans between 1907 and 1950, is well known.  That
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history explains the judicial rejections of non-voluntary sterilization that prevailed in the 1960's
and 1970's.  The judicial attitude subsequently changed in response to petitions by parents
seeking authorization for sterilization not for eugenic reasons, but supposedly because the
mentally disabled person’s own interests would be served.  And when judicial receptiveness to
surrogate petitions for authorization of sterilization emerged after 1980, it was accompanied by
strict procedural and substantive safeguards aimed at ensuring that sterilization would be
authorized only when the disabled patient’s interests so dictated.114  Under this post-1980
jurisprudence, sterilization could be authorized only after a judicial hearing at which the disabled
person was represented by counsel and after expert medical input regarding the patient’s welfare
with and without sterilization.  Courts articulated various areas of inquiry to guide the judicial
determination, including probability of pregnancy and availability of alternative contraceptive
means.  Most critically, the presiding judge could only authorize sterilization upon finding clear
and convincing evidence that sterilization would be in the disabled person’s best interests.115  A
few  jurisdictions went even further and insisted upon a finding of “medical necessity” as a
prerequisite to sterilization.116  Most courts have also articulated a strict best interests of the
patient standard in determining whether to authorize organ and tissue donations from
decisionally incapacitated patients.  Even the few courts articulating a substituted judgment
standard for purposes of authorizing an organ donation have ended up applying a best interests
standard -- a standard requiring a determination that the donating patient will incur a net benefit
despite the risks involved.   
Another area where courts have tended to articulate a strict best interests standard to
guide non-judicial surrogate decisionmakers is withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
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intervention.  While most jurisdictions allow private decisionmaking (usually by next of kin
acting in conjunction with medical personnel) rather than insisting upon judicial determinations
regarding end-of-life decisions, courts often impose a decisionmaking standard of clear and
convincing evidence that cessation of life support is in the best interests of the patient.117  This is
so as to previously competent persons who have not left indicia of their post-competence
treatment preferences, and it is especially so for never-competent persons (who could not have
issued prior instructions).  A best interests standard fixes the requisite finding for the surrogate as
clear and convincing evidence that the burdens of continued existence outweigh the benefits.  A
few sources see the clear and convincing standard as a constitutional requirement,118 but most see
that standard merely as an understandable (but not constitutionally required) precaution to
safeguard the lives and well being of vulnerable patients.119
While the clear and convincing evidence standard is a well-intentioned device, its
necessity or advisability in all end-of-life situations is quite debatable.  As I explained earlier,
discerning and measuring the actual burdens and benefits being experienced by profoundly
disabled persons is a daunting task.  It is not clear that net suffering can be clearly and
convincingly demonstrated in very many situations.120  A natural response to this fact might be:
“fine, if you can’t confidently say that a person’s suffering markedly outweighs his or her
satisfactions, then keep that person alive.”  Yet keep in mind a point made earlier -- that quality
of life, in the sense either of avoidance of irremediable suffering or avoidance of an intolerably
undignified status, is often the determinative factor shaping end-of-life treatment.  Both of these
elements arguably point toward some leeway in a bonded surrogate’s decision.  Perhaps, as some
commentators have suggested, surrogates with close bonds to their wards have an instinctive
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sense of whether their loved ones are suffering irremediably or whether they have reached a point
of such extreme deterioration and indignity that they are better off dead than alive.  Perhaps it
should be sufficient as a prerequisite to surrogate authorization of  removal of life support for a
surrogate to be able to reasonably say (subject to scrutiny by surrounding medical personnel and
even an institutional ethics committee) that the dying patient has permanently declined to a point
where continued medical intervention violates intrinsic human dignity.  (Keep in mind the earlier
point that the concept of  intolerable indignity for a never-competent person is not the same as
that for a formerly competent person.  The concept of intrinsic indignity for a never-competent
person is narrow, and must be cautiously applied).
Some relaxation of the strict requirement of clear and convincing evidence of net
suffering seems to have occurred in many jurisdictions, at least with regard to the status of
permanent unconscious persons.  A surrogate is allowed to forgo life support for a permanently
unconscious patient even though there can be no pretense that the burdens of the patient’s
continued existence clearly outweigh the benefits.121  The law accepts permanent
unconsciousness as an area in which a surrogate is allowed to say that a person’s deterioration is
so extreme that the person would be better off dead than alive.  (I have argued that offense to
intrinsic human dignity explains that conclusion).  Commentators like Nancy Rhoden have
convincingly argued that there should be other gray areas in which a bonded surrogate’s
judgment ought to be upheld unless some challenger (family member, health care provider, or
member of a protective agency) shows that the surrogate judgment is unreasonable.122   The point
is that “clear and convincing evidence” that burdens exceed benefits may be an overly stringent
standard as applied to gravely debilitated dying persons.
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A similar point can be raised about the standard guiding sterilization decisions on behalf
of profoundly disabled persons.  Numerous cases dictate that the burden of proof on any
surrogate seeking sterilization is a showing of clear and convincing evidence of best interests.123
The widespread judicial invocation of a “clear and convincing evidence” requirement was based
on the perception that sterilization entails a permanent impingement of a person’s fundamental
liberty interest in procreation.124  That perception is sound with regard to the range of mildly or
moderately disabled people who may be capable of child rearing.  But a profoundly disabled
person -- the subject matter here -- is incapable of assuming the role of a parent and raising a
child.  Absent that child-rearing capacity, sterilization does not deprive a person of a fundamental
interest in procreation.125  For a profoundly disabled person, the decision regarding sterilization is
like any serious medical decision.  It involves a serious bodily invasion and carries certain risks,
and a surrogate (a court under prevailing practice) must make a judgment whether the potential
gains warrant those negative consequences.  The potential gains for a profoundly disabled person
may include freedom from an incomprehensible burden of gestation, labor, and childbirth, and
sometimes freedom from intrusive personal monitoring interfering with sexual activity.126
Arguably, a court (or other surrogate) ought to be able to decide by a preponderance of the
evidence (rather than clear and convincing evidence) that pregnancy and birth carry greater
detriments for the profoundly disabled person than tubal ligation.  The preponderance of the
evidence standard is employed by at least a few courts already.127   Again, the idea is not to
discard the best interests standard as a determinative guideline, but to employ a lesser
requirement of proof than clear and convincing evidence in light of the unavoidable
indeterminacy of some medical issues.
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Can the Interests of Others be Included within a Patient’s Best Interests?
The previous section showed that critical medical decisions affecting profoundly disabled
persons -- including end-of-life decisions, sterilization, organ donation, and abortion -- are
supposed to be made according to a best interests of the patient standard.  (This was so even
though a surrogate is not always confined to the very best choice).  This section considers to what
extent, if any, the interests of others, particularly a loving family, might enter into a calculus of
the patient’s interests.  
Competing family interests arise and have obvious appeal to a surrogate decisionmaker in
a variety of circumstances.  For example, when the medical issue is maintenance of life-
sustaining treatment for a profoundly disabled, dying patient, emotional trauma being
experienced by surrounding loved ones is a potential consideration.  The emotional stake of
family could potentially influence the surrogate’s decision in either direction -- toward premature
termination of life support or toward unwarranted extension of life support.   A desire to relieve
extreme emotional, physical, and/or financial burdens on a family conducting an agonizing death
watch might tempt a surrogate to withdraw life support earlier than would otherwise be the case.  
On the other hand, family guilt or grief or unwillingness to come to terms with the impending
death can provide an incentive for prolonging the patient’s dying process beyond a humane point. 
Competing family interests are apparent in other medical contexts as well.  When a
surrogate contemplates an organ or tissue donation from a healthy, profoundly disabled person to
a critically ill sibling, the life of that sibling and the welfare of the family as a whole loom as
factors that might influence a decision to impose risks and burdens on the disabled donor.  When
a surrogate contemplates sterilization for a profoundly disabled person, potential family interests
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also arise -- including the burden of monitoring the patient’s behavior absent sterilization and
even the possible burden of child rearing should the disabled patient ultimately become a parent. 
One question, then, is what role, if any, these understandable and pressing family interests can
legitimately play in deciding the medical fate of a profoundly disabled patient.
Family interests are not the only possible distractions from focus on a mentally disabled
person’s best interests in the context of medical decisionmaking.  When the issue is sterilization
or abortion, for example, social interests are arguably implicated.
Public concerns about reproduction by mentally disabled persons impacted public policy
in the United States for many years.  A eugenic rationale was the impetus for the state statutes that
in the first half of the twentieth century impelled sterilization of many thousands of
instititutionalized disabled persons.  That is, the object was to protect and improve society by
preventing reproduction on the part of those persons deemed likely to produce mentally disabled
offspring.  Recall Justice Holmes’ famous 1927 comment that three generations of idiots were
enough.  As late as 1962, a court authorized sterilization of a retarded person on the basis that the
welfare of society would be promoted by the avoidance of more retarded children.128 In short,
social welfare, not the welfare of the affected individual, accounted for the original utilization of
non-voluntary sterilization.
The eugenic rationale for sterilization is now a thoroughly discredited relic.  While Buck
v. Bell has never been explicitly overruled, the widespread understanding among legal scholars is
that sweeping laws targeting the mentally disabled for sterilization -- as employed during the first
half of the twentieth century -- are surely unconstitutional.129 Focus has shifted from laws
mandating sterilization in order to improve the gene pool to individualized judicial determinations
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of whether a sterilization procedure promotes the best interests of a disabled person.  Petitions for
judicial authorization of sterilization came to be brought by parents or other guardians asserting
that sterilization would be in the best interests of their disabled wards.  The earliest judicial
appraisals of best interests tended to be skeptical about the motives for petitions and in the late
1960's and 1970's a number of state courts refused to authorize sterilization of retarded persons in
response to petitions by parents.130 Several factors influenced these decisions -- revulsion at the
sorry history of eugenic sterilization, concern for protecting the emerging constitutional liberty
interest in procreation, and fear that common prejudices about disabled persons would prompt
abusive sterilization decisions.131
In the 1980's, the common judicial attitude shifted perceptibly.  More and more state
courts ruled that judges had parens patriae power (grounded in their intrinsic equity jurisdiction)
to authorize sterilization so long as such a surgical procedure was found to be in the best interests
of a profoundly disabled person.132 And while the courts didn’t always grant a parental petition,
they did recognize that certain factors sometimes make sterilization consistent with the disabled
person’s own interests.  A disabled person might have a medical condition that would make
pregnancy and/or childbirth either a hazardous or torturous process.  Or pregnancy, labor, and
delivery might have grave emotional consequences for a profoundly disabled woman having no
grasp of the concept of pregnancy and its natural outcome.  Or a profoundly disabled person may
have an interest in sexual interactions free from the intrusive monitoring that would be necessary
if effective contraception were not in place.  Such factors might, depending on the circumstances,
justify a sterilization procedure despite the attendant bodily invasion, pain, medical risks, and
impact on future procreation.  And the public has a pecuniary interest in all forms of contraceptive
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decisions where either the medical procedure will be financed by public funds or where any
offspring will become public charges.  While a person’s liberty interest in procreation is
constitutionally protected, it is surely less robust where the potential parent is clearly incapable of
raising a child.  In order to safeguard against biased or exploitative sterilization decisions, the
courts prescribed careful procedures for determining the potential patient’s best interests,
including a full hearing, legal representation for the disabled person, full medical investigation,
and clear and convincing evidence that sterilization would indeed be in the patient’s interests
because less invasive contraceptive alternatives were absent.
These precedents demonstrate judicial recognition that a disabled person’s own interests
can sometimes dictate sterilization.  They also state that the interests of third parties -- parents,
institutional personnel, or society as a whole -- cannot properly enter into a best interests calculus. 
But they do not address whether there is a valid theoretical justification for injecting third party
interests into surrogate medical decisionmaking on behalf of never-competent persons.  I will
briefly consider whether such a theoretical underpinning exists.   
One claim for inclusion of third party interests is that justice or fairness requires it.  John
Hardwig is the principal advocate for that proposition.133 Hardwig argues that where families
have struggled and sacrificed for the incapacitated patient (and where a medical decision entails
burdens upon the surrounding family), fairness and equity demand consideration of family
interests along with those of the patient.  For him, the surrogate decisionmaker should “harmonize
and balance” family interests in order to avoid the “injustice” of an exclusively patient-centered
ethic.  Such consideration of family interests would have impact in many circumstances, including
a situation where caring for an infant born with multiple deficits would impose considerable
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emotional and economic costs on parents and siblings.134
A similar argument (that considerations of fairness or justice warrant attention to third
party interests) can be constructed when a surrogate is contemplating sterilization for a profoundly
disabled person.  For example, where the disabled person is living at home, absence of effective
contraception may significantly increase the supervision or monitoring burden upon devoted
caretakers already expending considerable efforts on behalf of the disabled person.135 Or where a
disabled person is incapable of child rearing, so that any child born to that person will end up
being the responsibility either of the disabled person’s parents or state social service agencies,
there’s room for a claim that fairness dictates attention to third party interests (including the well
being of the helpless prospective child) in weighing the possibility of sterilization.
A justice rationale for injecting other parties’ interests into determination of an innocent
and helpless person’s medical fate is questionable.  Justice does not demand that a caretaker be
free of all onerous burdens.  The potential for “unfair” burden is implicit whenever a person
assumes a relation entailing responsibility for another person.  This is so for a guardian, a spouse,
a parent, or even a teacher.  In all these situations, the burdens of caretaking sometimes turn out to
be disproportionate to the benefits.  A once satisfying marital relationship may be rendered
torturous as a result of an accident making one spouse totally dependent on the other.  This may
be unlucky for the person suddenly saddled by caretaking, but perhaps it’s not unjust for a spouse
or parent to be saddled with unexpected burdens.  Justice cannot mean that burdens within a
relationship must mesh perfectly with deserts.  Persons entering into these fiduciary relationships
understand at the outset that burdens may turn out to exceed any anticipated rewards.  Also, the
person whose serious medical fate is being determined is usually an innocent victim of some
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art24
-51-
serious affliction (as opposed to someone who is simply being self-indulgent).
Another concern about achieving justice under John Hardwig’s approach is that it
ostensibly would entail a difficult and unseemly calculus by any surrogate decisionmaker. 
Hardwig’s fairness calculation involves a case by case assessment of the degree of burden and
sacrifice previously or prospectively invested by the third party (family member) whose interests
are to be considered.136 For Hardwig, a parent who has previously been inattentive toward a child
does not deserve much solicitude in determining whether the burdens of future care might be
“unfair.”  Yet this kind of inquiry into relational history is arguably unseemly and not well suited
to the surrogate or to medical personnel attending the incapacitated patient whose fate is being
determined.  There is also the problem of incommensurability.  In the end-of-life decisionmaking
context, for example, how much do physical and emotional tolls on surrounding family count
when weighed against a period of debilitated, but tolerable existence for the dying patient?  It is
hard enough to determine the net interests of the patient without bringing third party burdens into
the best interests formula.137
An alternative rationale for consideration of third party interests is fulfillment of the
putative wishes of the disabled patient.  Both the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and the New York Task Force on Life and the Law -- two of the most
distinguished bodies that have analysed end-of-life decisionmaking -- have suggested that a best
interests decisionmaking formula might accommodate third party interests on the theory that the
now-incapacitated patient would want burdens on loved ones to come into play.138 This approach
certainly makes sense where the patient was previously competent and articulated his or her
concern for loved ones when contemplating a future dying process.  The patient’s prior attitude
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toward familial interests counts either under a substituted judgment approach (trying to replicate
the patient’s wishes) or because the patient’s articulated values and preferences help to shape the
content of that patient’s best interests.139 As to a previously competent patient, it might also make
sense to consider family interests even if the patient has not previously expressed that wish, on the
theory suggested by the New York State Task Force that most people have such strong solicitude
for their immediate families that they would want such interests to be considered.140 Some
surveys of seriously ill people’s preferences for their own end-of-life handling do show strong
concern for the physical and emotional burdens to be posed for surrounding loved ones.141 Thus,
there is some empirical support for the Task Force’s rationale.
Whatever the appeal of using family interests as a decision-making factor with regard to
previously competent patients, it’s problematic to ascribe to lifelong profoundly disabled persons an
altruistic wish to have the interests of loved ones considered in critical medical decisions.  I have
already rejected a substituted judgment formula in this decision-making context because profoundly
disabled persons never had the capacity to form determinative wishes on complex issues of medical
decisionmaking.  That incapacity applies to the task of weighing third party interests against the
patient’s own well being.  As Margaret Battin has noted,142 altruism that deserves respect is the
product of deliberation about the positives and negatives of self-sacrifice.  The attribution of a wish
to show consideration for the interests of others is a convenient fiction in the context of never-
competent persons.143 There may be good reasons to consider third party interests along with the
profoundly disabled patient’s, but fulfillment of putative wishes is not one of them.
Third party interests may incidentally enter the picture of surrogate decisionmaking when
they happen to coincide with an incapacitated patient’s own interests.  There are a few situations
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where the interests of a profoundly disabled person can be materially advanced by an action that
immediately benefits a surrounding family member.  This is sometimes the claim, for example,
where parents seek to harvest a non-vital organ from a profoundly disabled person; assertedly, the
disabled person would be harmed by failure to donate the organ because that person would lose a
devoted caretaker (the organ donee) or because the family would be so  devastated by the loss of a
family member that the disabled donor would suffer.  Or a family might claim that sterilization is in
the best interests of a disabled person because otherwise the family unit would be severely disrupted
by the burden of supervising the disabled person’s sexual behavior; family peace of mind then
supposedly furnishes a benefit to the person slated for sterilization.144 These claims warrant
consideration by a surrogate decisionmaker, as there are indeed instances when the interests of the
incapacitated patient and the affected family members coincide.  But in the absence of such
circumstances where the disabled person benefits derivatively from accommodation of loved ones’
needs, attribution of altruistic wishes to the profoundly disabled patient or inclusion of third party
interests within the patient’s interests rings hollow.
What do the cases and commentators say about the relation between a mentally incapacitated
patient’s medical fate and third party interests?  The issue has perhaps received the most attention in
cases addressing surrogate decisionmaking on behalf of previously competent persons.  In that
context, some courts do suggest that the interests of a now-incapacitated patient’s family are an
appropriate part of the surrogate’s decision-making calculus.  This approach is most common in
jurisdictions using a substituted judgment standard, i.e., the surrogate is supposed to follow the
patient’s actual or likely wishes.  Some courts using a substituted judgment approach are willing to
employ a premise that most competent people care considerably about the physical, emotional, and
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financial well being of loved ones.  As long as the now-incapacitated patient was previously
intimately connected with family, they allow a surrogate to project that the patient would want
burdens on the family to be a relevant factor in medical decisionmaking on the now-incompetent
patient’s behalf.  One court commented: “An individual who is part of a closely knit family would
doubtless take into account the impact his acceptance or refusal of treatment would likely have on
his family.”145
Where the ward is a never-competent person, there appears to be much less judicial
willingness to permit third-party interests -- including burdens on family or caretakers -- to play a
role in surrogate medical decisionmaking.  This is especially so where the ward is institutionalized
(therefore not part of an intact family unit) or is an infant who has never been part of a family unit. 
For example, in one case involving life support for a permanently unconscious child, and another
involving dialysis for an institutionalized, mentally disabled person, the courts determined to ignore
burdens on family or institutions as a relevant consideration.146 In the latter instance, when the trial
court mentioned the potential burden placed on the patient’s family from a dialysis regimen as a
relevant decision-making factor, the appellate court admonished that the interests of persons other
than the patient must be ignored in fixing the patient’s medical course.
Non-judicial commentary within the field of death and dying is more divided, particularly as
to the moral relevance of third party interests in deciding the fate of a mentally incapacitated patient. 
Some commentators, like Yale Kamisar, insist that so long as an incapacitated patient has even the
slightest interest in continued existence, burdens upon others have no appropriate role in a decision-
making calculus.147 Other commentators see the interests of third parties as an appropriate or even
necessary factor in surrogate decisionmaking.148
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All ambivalence about the role of third party interests is absent from the judicial expressions
in the post-1980 cases regarding sterilization in the best interests of a mentally incapacitated ward. 
This line of cases is acutely sensitive to the fact that earlier generations of mentally disabled persons
had been exploited by non-voluntary eugenic sterilization.  (Keep in mind also that sterilization
decisions generally involve never-competent rather than formerly competent patients -- thus making
it harder to attribute altruism or solicitude for the interests of others to an incapacitated person). 
The cases uniformly and unequivocally stress that any surrogate authorization of sterilization for an
incapacitated person must be grounded on the ward’s own interests.  The following quotations are
typical in their insistence upon exclusive focus on the ward’s interests.  “[T]he court considers only
the best interests of the incompetent, not the interests or convenience of parents, guardians, or
society.”149 “The fundamental right involved must be safeguarded to assure that sterilization is not a
subterfuge for convenience and relief from the responsibility of supervision.”150 “[In considering
the ward’s best interests], the welfare of society or the convenience or peace of mind of the ward’s
parents or guardian plays no part.”151 The post-1980 opinions not only disclaim any reliance on
family or social interests in making best interests determinations, they constantly emphasize the
importance of protecting the health and procreative interests of the disabled person for whom
sterilization is being contemplated.
In sum, the current doctrinal framework of best interests leaves little room for surrogate
consideration of third party interests in the settings of sterilization or end-of-life medical decisions
on behalf of never-competent persons.  The whole best interests formula is geared to protecting the
interests of helpless persons themselves without consideration of the incommensurate interests of
the helpless person’s family or caretakers.  Law is understandably reluctant to openly encourage
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balancing of a helpless person’s life or procreative capacity against the comfort, convenience, and
well being of others.  The main exception (in the context of end-of-life decisionmaking) is for
previously competent persons who may have defined their personal interests as embracing the well
being of others -- an exception that cannot apply to lifelong disabled persons.
From my perspective, all this judicial emphasis on patients’ well being does not mean that
third party interests are in fact irrelevant to surrogate decisionmaking on behalf of profoundly
disabled persons.  The reality is that third party interests constitute a “looming omnipresence”
influencing surrogate decisionmaking in subtle and not so subtle ways.152 And at least at the
margins -- meaning circumstances where the burdens on third parties are extreme and the net
interests of an incapacitated ward are very much in doubt -- the impact of third party interests seems
inevitable and legitimate.  
A number of situations reflect the almost unavoidable impact of third party interests.  One
such situation is where a critically ill, incapacitated person is experiencing a difficult dying process
causing emotional anguish to the surrounding family.  This emotional burden upon the family might
impel the family, acting as surrogate decisionmaker, in either of two directions -- unwarranted
extension of artificial life support or premature termination of such support.  An example of the
former is a situation where a family is insisting that a gravely debilitated, dying patient be
maintained on life support despite the health care providers’ perception that the unconscious, or
semi-conscious, or conscious and suffering patient is deriving no benefit from the continued care. 
The family may be motivated by grief, by guilt at being the agent of termination of a loved one’s
life, or by their religious conviction that all life is precious.  Many health care providers will defer to
the family’s wishes not because the patient’s best interests dictate continued medical intervention,
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but because the providers are either solicitous of the family’s discomfort or fearful of antagonizing
the family.  The surrounding family members are in a position to make a fuss and assert their
interests while the patient is oblivious or at least helpless.  Rather than create friction and
controversy and possible bad publicity, the health care providers acquiesce in this derogation of the
patient’s interests.153
Sometimes, the impetus stemming from consideration of family interests is in the opposite
direction -- toward termination of life support.  This is almost certainly the case when an infant is
born with multiple, severe deficits.  While the medical personnel may not yet be able to assess the
precise long-term fate of the infant, they know already that the parents will be facing enormous
hardship and stress and that the infant’s eventual quality of life is problematic at best.  A strong
temptation then exists for the attending physician to take cognizance of the parental ordeal ahead
and to influence the parents to consent to withholding of life-sustaining medical intervention -- not
because of the infant’s best interests but because of the family interests at stake.154 That
consideration of family interests was overt in the 1970's when physicians started writing about
selective non-treatment of newborns.155 Raymond Duff, a well known neonatologist of the time,
operated on the premise that “families need to be spared the chronic sorrow of caring for infants
with little or no possibility of meaningful lives.”  A similar attitude continues today among some
physicians, albeit in more covert fashion.  
A comparable phenomenon likely takes place where an adult patient has deteriorated to a
point at which there is little chance of the patient’s deriving benefit from continued medical
intervention.  When the patient has reached this gray area in which any benefit (other than
biological existence) is dubious, there’s a strong impetus for the surrogate decisionmaker and
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attending medical personnel to bring the interests of the patient’s loved ones into consideration.156 
This is one of the margins at which third party interests almost inevitably come into play.
The marginal influence of third party interests is perceptible in other medical contexts as
well.  The phenomenon seems to occur when the medical issue is organ or tissue donation from a
mentally disabled person to a critically ill sibling or other close relative.  While the cases articulate a
strict best interests of the donor patient standard, in applying that standard the surrogate
decisionmakers appear to be influenced by the critical need of the sick relative.  That is, tissue
donation will sometimes be authorized when the donee relative’s survival will help the donor
patient in some measure (as a caretaker) even though it is unclear whether donation will really
further the donor’s best interests.  Also, when a mentally disabled person is living at home with
siblings and parents, it is almost impossible for a surrogate decisionmaker to ignore those third
party interests.  This fact was acknowledged in a case where the medical issue was whether to
authorize anti-psychotic medication for a mentally ill child living at home with his siblings.157
The dollar cost of end-of-life treatment is another part of the “looming omnipresence” of
third-party interests.  Treatment and non-treatment decisions are unquestionably influenced by cost
factors, at least where the costs are considerable and where the patient’s status is so debilitated that
it is unclear where the patient’s best interests lie, i.e., whether the patient is better off dead than
alive.  While medical protocols and even state statutes may exclude cost as a relevant factor,158 high
cost is almost impossible to disregard.  For example, if there is only a very slight chance that a
medical intervention will be successful in extending life, and if the proposed intervention is
extremely expensive, cost will likely impact on the medical decision.159 Sometimes, the role of
health care cost is explicitly recognized.  For example, society makes allowance for parents who are
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facing extraordinary financial hurdles with regard to their children’s medical care.  An explicit
exemption under child neglect statutes is provided for parental failure to provide medical care that
would be beyond the family’s financial capability.  Nor is the influence of economics reserved to
the setting of incapacitated patients.  Society limits the funding of some expensive medical
procedures on the basis of cost-worthiness even where competent patients are involved.160 
As in the case of end-of-life surrogate decisionmaking, it is impossible to entirely exclude
consideration of the prospective burdens on others when a surrogate is deciding whether to
authorize a sterilization procedure.  Those burdens act as a “looming omnipresence” over the
surrogate’s weighing of sterilization just as they do in the death and dying setting.  For example, the
burdens involved in supervision of a disabled patient (in order to prevent unprotected sexual
activity) unavoidably play a role when sterilization is in issue.  While the judicial opinions
constantly stress that close supervision of the disabled person should be considered as a less drastic
alternative to sterilization, and they admonish that convenience to caregivers should not be a factor,
they really mean that reasonable supervision efforts should be considered.  At some point, the
burden of constant supervision becomes an unreasonable burden on caretakers, a fact that ultimately
gets noted.161 (Of course, courts also recognize that constant supervision as an alternative to
sterilization can be restrictive to the disabled person and counter to the maximal normalization that
is an object of enlightened caretaking).162 And while it is unseemly for courts to mention the
potential financial burden on the state in raising any offspring of a profoundly disabled person, that
factor too looms over the sterilization determination.163  Again, at the margins or extremes the
interests of third parties do inevitably influence surrogate determinations of whether to authorize
sterilization for a profoundly disabled ward.
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The lesson here is that a best interests decision-making standard cannot be applied in a
manner that entirely exludes third-party interests.  The looming omnipresence of family emotional
and financial interests inevitably materializes and influences decisionmaking in extreme cases --
especially where the pure best interests of the patient are difficult to determine and where the
burdens upon others are considerable.  This is not shocking.  While I previously noted that justice
does not mean that caretakers must be freed from onerous burdens, it may be fair to consider the
sacrifices that caretakers make, at least at the margins where the interests of the disabled wards are
indeterminate or in equipoise.  Consideration of family interests at the margins recognizes that there
is a limit to the duty of sacrifice that even a fiduciary such as a parent or guardian owes to his or her
ward.  Some kinds of parental or family sacrifices are unreasonable.  A parent shouldn’t have to
bankrupt a family in order to extend a dying child’s life.  A parent shouldn’t have to jeopardize the
well being of a sibling (by diverting important resources away from that healthy person), even in
order to extend another child’s life.
Consider the case of the conjoined twins that was litigated recently in Great Britain.164 Both
twins would have died absent separation.  Physicians demanded that the parents authorize a
separation operation that might preserve the healthier twin but would precipitate the prompt death
of the feebler twin.  When the parents refused to accelerate one child’s death (even for the purpose
of rescuing the other child), the British courts intervened and ordered the operation.  To me, it
seems wrong to call the parents’ conduct child neglect.165 Yes, the parents were failing to save their
salvageable child’s life, but their conduct was inspired by unwillingness to precipitate their other
child’s prompt death.  To me, this is an illustration of the rare case where consideration of a third
party’s interest (the feebler twin) warranted a parental choice not to pursue the pure best interests of
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a dependent child (the stronger twin).  
It is debatable whether consideration of family and other third party interests should be
explicitly articulated as part of a best interests formula.166 The current framework is deceptive in
ostensibly excluding third party interests while actually tolerating them in certain circumstances. 
Yet, arguably, third party interests should be left as a looming omnipresence in the hope that they
will be employed only at the margins where they almost unavoidably come into play.  Open
endorsement risks encouraging an extension of consideration of third-party interests to a broad
range of circumstances where the incommensurate nature of other people’s interests might
undermine sound surrogate decisionmaking on behalf of an incapacitated patient.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The medical fate of never-competent persons cannot be resolved according to the approach
governing previously competent persons -- surrogate focus on self-determination or constructive
autonomy.  For never-competent medical patients, the commonly stated approach to surrogate
decision making is best interests of the incapacitated ward.  However, the literal best interests
standard gets applied primarily when a governmental agent -- usually a court -- is the responsible
decision-maker.  When a parent is the surrogate decision maker, the medical course chosen need not
be the best course, so long as it is a plausible medical option and is not so antithetical to the
patient’s interests as to constitute neglect or abuse.  And while third party interests are not officially
part of a never-competent patient’s interests, third-party interests constitute a looming omnipresence
that inevitably influences surrogate decision making at the margins.  That is so especially where the
never-competent patient’s own interests are murky or in equipoise, and the potential impact on third
parties is extreme.
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1
  See Ben A. Rich, Reflections on the Social Construction of Death, 24 J. Legal Med.
233, 239 (2003).
Never-competent persons, as possessors of full moral status, are also entitled to be treated
with dignity.  This normally means that a surrogate decision-maker will maximally preserve the life
of a ward.  Sometimes, though, respect for the intrinsic human dignity of a fatally stricken ward
dictates that the ward be allowed to die.  A permanently unconscious person offers an example,1 as
does an infant with multiple deficits whose short life will be pervaded by intrusive medical
interventions.  In these rare instances, the deterioration or debilitation of a human being is so
extreme that further medical intervention would be inhumane.  This is so for some never-competent
persons, just as it is  for some formerly competent persons.
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1.  In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (N.J. 1981).  See also Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae
from Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 South Carolina L. Rev. 205, 240 (1971).
2.  I define profoundly disabled persons as people whose cognitive function places them at the
bottom of the ranges applicable to the mentally retarded.  Mental retardation is roughly defined
as significantly subaverage intelligence (less that 70 I.Q.) coupled with substantial impairments
in at least two areas of social behavior.  Burton Blatt, The Conquest of Mental Retardation
(1987) 68-69; James W. Ellis, Decisions By and For People with Mental Retardation: Balancing
Considerations of Autonomy and Protection, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1779, 1795 (1992).  Most retarded
persons, however, have enough cognitive capacity to make at least some medical decisions for
themselves.  The contemporary approach is to assess decision-making capacity according to the
complexity of the particular issue at hand and to grant self-determination to any person,
regardless of mental disability, who can understand the nature and consequences of that issue and
is capable of exercising rational choice.  Even under this approach seeking to maximize the self-
determination opportunities of the mentally disabled, some persons are so mentally impaired that
they can make virtually no medical decisions for themselves.  I am referring to the small
percentage of mentally disabled persons whose IQ is below 30, qualifying them as severely or
profoundly retarded.  See Thomas L. Whitman, Cynthia L. Miller, & Deirdre Mylod, Mental
Retardation, in Encyclopedia of Disability and Rehabilitation.  These persons are so severely
cognitively disabled that any important decision affecting them must ultimately be made by some
surrogate.
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3.  I use the term persons here advisedly.  Some moral philosophers contend that human beings
who are profoundly mentally disabled do not meet the minimum criteria for personhood. 
However, law appropriately treats the profoundly disabled as persons and I will use that
terminology throughout.
4.  Alan Handler, Individual Worth, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 493, 528 (1989); Michael Kindred,
Guardianships and Limitations Upon Capacity, in Mentally Retarded Citizens and the Law
(Kindred, ed.       ), 85 n.109.  Surrogate decisionmaking is also necessary for previously
competent persons who have lost the requisite capacity for medical choices.  However, as will be
explained infra, the legal framework is somewhat different for previously competent persons. 
The focus of this article is profoundly disabled, never-competent persons.
5.  For a review of the earliest cases addressing surrogates’ end of life determinations, see
Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-five Years after Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of Death
and Dying, 29 J. of Law, Medicine & Ethics 182, 183-84 (2001).
6.  See In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)(implementing the formerly
competent patient’s deeply felt religious preferences is the “only way to pay full respect to the
individuality and dignity” of that person); A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1247, 1249-50 (D.C. Ct. App.
1990).
7.  A.C., 573 A.2d at 1249-50; Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
430 n.15 (Mass. 1976); In re Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216, 1220 (D.C. App. 1988).
8.  For further explanation of how people’s common preferences shape end-of-life
decisionmaking, see Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests:
Toward a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without
Advance Instructions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 1193 (1996).  See also John Arras, The Severely
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art24
-65-
Demented, Minimally Functional Patient: An Ethical Analysis, 36 J. Am. Geriat. Soc’y 938, 943
(1988).  
9.  To honor self-determination, “we should try our honest best to do what we think [the formerly
competent patient] would have chosen.”  Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Human
Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (2001), 245.
10.  This is not to say that the expressions of incapacitated persons are irrelevant to surrogate
decisionmaking.  The wishes and feelings of never-competent persons are still important for
surrogate decisionmakers.
11.  Allen Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 386, 397 (1981).
12.  Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d      , 1326 (Ill. 199 ).  See also In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180,
181-82 (Wis. 1975); Matter of Susan S., 1996 WL 75343 (Del. Ch. 1996): “It is one thing to
imagine what a person who was once of sound mind would have done in a given situation and
quite another to imagine the same thing for someone who was never of sound mind.” 
13.  Truselo v. Carroll, 2000 WL 33324536 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2000).  See also In re K.I. 735 A.2d
448, 455-56 (D.C. 1999); In re Christopher I., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 133 (Calif. App. 2003).
14.  Max Charlesworth, Disabled Newborn Infants and the Quality of Life, 9 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Policy 129, 136 (1993); Max Charlesworth, Bioethics in a Liberal Society (1993), 51-52. 
See also In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984); In re Barry, 445 So.2d 365 (Fla. Ct. App.
1984); Matter of Susan S., 1996 WL 75343 (Del. Ch. 1996)(using substituted judgment in a
sterilization case).
15.James W. Walters, What is a Person? (1997), 60; Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment
(1992), 20.  
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16.  370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1976).
17.  AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Section 2.20; Los Angeles County Medical
Association, Guidelines               4-5; John M. Stanley et al, The Appleton Consensus: 
Suggested International Guidelines for Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment, 15 J. Medical
Ethics 129, 133 (1989) (critical issue for surrogates is whether “continued treatment would lead
to unacceptable burdens without sufficient compensating benefits”).  
18.  E.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1986); Matter of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Wis.
1992); In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1181 (Ill. App. 1992); K.I., 735 A.2d 448 (D.C. 1999).
19.  Johanna Meehan, Plurality, Autonomy, and the Right to Take One’s Life, 47 Drake L. Rev.
87, 102-03 (1998)(relying on Elaine Scurry, The Body in Pain (1986)); Jamie Mayerfeld,
Suffering and Moral Responsibility (1999), 24-27, 40-42.
20.  President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, Deciding to Forgo
Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983), 136; Beauchamp & Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics
(4th ed. 1994), 218; Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in Exposing Children to Risks in Research, in
Children as Research Subjects (M. Grodin & L. Glantz eds. 1994), 85.  K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 464
(D.C. 1999)(quoting Karen Rothenberg, 33 St. Louis U. L.J. 575    ; Wentzel, supra note     , 447
A.2d at 1258.  
21.  Paul B. Solnick, Proxy Consent for Incompetent Non-Terminally Ill Adult Patients, 6 J.
Legal Medicine 1, 15 (1985).  
22.   See Susan R. Martyn, Substituted Judgment, Best Interests, and the Need for Best Respect,
3 Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care Ethics 195, 200 (1994) (“The central inquiry is whether
continued life currently has value to [the never-competent patient]”); [Mark R. Wicclair, Ethics
and the Elderly (1993)]       at 58-60; 
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23.  R.S. Downie & K.C. Calman, Healthy Respect: Ethics in Health Care (2d ed. 1994), 75.  See
also Martha Minow, Making All the Difference (1990), 327-28.
24.  Lois Sheperd ably describes the phenomenon of projecting the surrogate’s own feelings in
the course of imagining what life is like for a profoundly disabled person.  Lois Sheperd, Face to
Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in Place of Compassion, Public Law and Legal Theory,
Working Paper # 77 (April 2003), 11, 16.
25.  Dena S. Davis, Old and Thin, 15:   , Second Opinion (Nov. 1990), 26, 29-30.
26.  P. Riga, Right to Die or Right to Live?  Legal Aspects of Death and Dying (1981) 155.
27. Nazi doctors perceived disabled lives as inherently stressful that ending those lives would be
relieving the unfit from their own misery.
28.  Baby Doe v. Hancock County Board of Health, 436 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1982)
29.  Stephen G. Post, Dementia in our Midst: The Moral Community, 4 Cambridge Q. Of Health
Care Ethics 142, 143-44 (1995).   
30.  Rebecca Dresser has written often and incisively about the difficulty of assessing the
experiential reality of disabled persons supplying little or no verbal input. Dresser & John
Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 17 J. Law,
Medicine & Health Care 234, 241 (1989); R. Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perspectives of
Incompetent Patients, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 609 (1994); R. Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51
Ohio State L.J. 425, 428 (1994).  On the difficulty of discerning the true feelings of aware but
non-communicative dying persons, see Michael H. Cohen, Toward a Bioethics of Compassion,
28 Ind. L. Rev. 667, 674-75 (1995).   
31.  Susan Martyn, Substituted Judgment, Best Interests, and the Need for Best Respect, 3
Cambridge Q. of Health Care Ethics 195, 199-201 (1994).
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32.  For an example, see Matter of R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Mass. App. 1993)  (regarding
initiation of kidney dialysis for a mentally retarded patient).
33.  See generally Robert Weir, Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns 
34.  Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991); In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 460 (D.C.
1999); In re C.A.  603 N.E.2d 1171, 1181-82 (Ill. App. 1992); Truselo v. Carroll, 2000 WL
33324536 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2000); Tina Kelley, Ruling Supports Parents’ Rights to Decide on
Child’s Life Support, N.Y. Times, 5/17/2003.  But see Infant C.,1995 WL 1058596 (Va. Cir. Ct.
1995)(a lower court disclaiming authority to authorize a DNR order for a neurologically
devastated 1 year-old in the custody of the state department of social services); Miller v. Hospital
Corporation of America, #14-98-00582 (Texas Civ. App. 2001), affirmed          S.W.2d     
(Texas 2003; Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. App. 2002).
35.  On the disparate perspectives of competent adults and profoundly disabled infants, see John
D. Arras, Toward an Ethic of Ambiguity, 14:2 Hastings Center Rep. (April 1984), 29-31.
36.  Weiser, Washington Post, 7/14/91, p. A-1.  See also Kathleen Knepper, Withholding
Medical Treatment from Infants: When Is It Neglect?  33 U. of Louisville J. or Family Law 1, 21
(1994).
37.  On the problematic of judging when a profoundly disabled person’s existence is “too painful
to be bearable,” see Carl E. Schneider, Hard Cases, 28:2 Hastings Center Rep. (March 1998), 24
(recounting the story of Tracy Latimer,                          , killed by her father in order to end her
suffering).  
38.  Peter G. Filene, In the Arms of Others (1999), 109-10.  (Infant Doe’s parents “necessarily
projected their own values, feelings, and needs about whether extending his life would be
worthwhile.”)
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39.  Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).  See generally Tucker &
Goldstein at pages 19:16 to 19:18. 
40.  Id. at 19:21, quoting from 42 U.S.C.A. Section 5106(g)(10). 
41.  Id. at 19:22, citing 45 C.F.R. Part 1340; Knepper, supra note          at 18-19.
42.  Carol A. Heimer, Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine and Family in Neonatal Intensive
Care, 33 Law & Society Review 17, 57 (1999). 
43.  But see Montalvo, supra note          , contending that the federal regulations are directly
applicable to clinical practice.
44.  Tracy K. Koogler, Benjamin S. Wilfond, & Lainie Friedman Ross, Lethal Language, Lethal
Decisions, 33:2 Hastings Center Report (2003), 37, 38-39.  See also Truselo v. Carroll, supra
note          ; Angie L. Guevara, Note, In re K.I.: An Urgent Need for a Uniform System in the
Treatment of the Critically Ill Infant, 36 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 237, 247 (2001).
45.  See Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr 477, 479-81 (Cal. App. 1980), described in Shepherd, supra
note   at 43 n.102.  
46.  Betty Dew, Do Those Who Cannot Speak Really Have a Voice? 20 Law, Med. & Healthcare
316 (1992)(recounting the case of Joseph Finelli, a 57 year-old brain damaged patient).  
47.  In re R.,       [1996] 3 FCR 473, 31 BMLR 127, 2 FLR 99.
48.  National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral
Reflections, 15 J. Contemporary Health Law & Policy 455, 469 (1999).
49.  Teresa Harvey Paredes, The Killing Words?  How the New Quality of Life Ethic Affects
People with Severe Disabilities, 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 805, 829 (1992).
50.  Matter of Jane A., 629 N.E.2d 1337, 1340 (Mass. App. 1994).  John Storar was a profoundly
disabled adult who found cancer therapy (involving blood transfusions) to be disagreeable and
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distressing in part because of non-comprehension of their purpose.  Nonetheless, a New York
court ruled that sedation would sufficiently mitigate John’s apprehensions to make continued
chemotherapy be in John’s best interests.  In re Storar, 
51.  President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, Deciding to Forgo
Life-Sustaining Treatment (1983), 135.  See also Guevara, supra note          at 247-48 citing
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52.  See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 451
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